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MILITARY-ENGINEERING ACADEMY: TRAINING METHODS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 79 signed to press 5 Nov 79 pp 18-24

[Article by Maj Gen A. Averin, chief of the Political Section of the V. V. Kuybyshev Military-Engineering Academy: "Indoctrination of Students--A Comprehensive Process"]

[Text] The role and importance of ideological and political indoctrination of the workers and fighting men in the army and navy are growing immeasurably under mature socialism, when the immediate tasks involved in building communism are being performed and large socioeconomic and spiritual reforms are being accomplished. Following decisions coming out of the 25th congress, the party regards the work of raising of awareness and social activity among the masses as an important sector of the effort to build communism. This concept is prominent throughout the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work."

Special demands are now made with respect to the performance skills and ideological conditioning of graduates of the nation's higher educational institutions. As the decree recently passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Further Development of the Higher School and Improvement of Specialist Training" stresses, the higher school's main focus should be upon improving the quality of professional training and indeological and political indoctrination of the specialists and strengthening its ties with production and with the practical work of building communism. It is perfectly obvious that these demands apply in full to the military academies and schools.

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the fact that a military academy, regardless of the type of training provided there, should provide its students with a real school of ideological maturation. By learning Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology and acquiring professional knowledge and skills and good moral qualities, the officers acquire the capability of training and indoctrinating their men far more effectively and leading the units and subunits more successfully following their graduation

from the academy. This is why command, the political section and party organizations at the V. V. Kuybyshev Military-Engineering Academy devote constant attention to making the training and indoctrinational work more effective with a comprehensive approach. A certain amount of experience has already been acquired, experience attesting the results of efforts taken to insure close unity of the ideological and political, military, labor and moral indoctrination of the students, taking into account the peculiarities of the various categories making up the student body.

First of all, we became convinced that to adopt a comprehensive approach means extending ideological influence to all areas of academy life. Training and indoctrinational and scientific research, Marxist-Leninist training, socialist competition and leisure time are not separated from each other, but are organically interlinked and interdependent. Imperfections or omissions in any one area can have undesirable consequences sooner or later. When we organize and conduct ideological and indoctrinational activities, we therefore attempt to keep in mind the various aspects of the training and lives of the students and to consider their requests to the fullest possible extent.

Application of the achievements and conclusions of the social, natural and technical sciences for indoctrinational purposes is an important feature of the comprehensive approach. The tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy and scientific communism form a solid theoretical foundation for the ideological conditioning of military engineers. The study of military pedagogics and psychology helps the students to grasp the essence, substance and structure of interpersonal relations and to master methods of uniting the collective and developing mature social attitudes. The conclusions reached by military science serve as a guideline for developing moral and political, combat and psychological qualities in the fighting men, which measure up to the nature and the peculiarities of modern warfare. As a rule, the scientific expediency of ideological and indoctrinational measures is determined by the scientific reasoning behind them.

An important advantage of the comprehensive approach lies in the fact that it permits commanders and chiefs, political workers, professors and instructors to gain a clear understanding of the intrinsic logic of the training and indoctrinational process and the nature and structure of the ties between the training and indoctrination, the intellectual and physical development and the psychological conditioning of the students, and makes it possible to define a realistic program of purposive influence upon the collective and the individual in each specific case.

Training and political and indoctrinational work meeting the requirements of a systematic, comprehensive approach is oriented toward the achievement of interrelated objectives such as developing a scientific world outlook and selfless devotion to communist ideals, to the party cause and to the socialist homeland in the students; preparing highly skilled specialists capable of performing the complex tasks involved in engineer support of

modern combat; and developing an active posture in life, unity of word and deed and preparedness to fulfill one's military duty. Naturally, we are also performing the task of equipping the students with methods for training and indoctrinating the personnel. Only after acquiring the proper theoretical knowledge and methodological procedures can the future military engineer and commander develop good ideological and political qualities, morale and fighting efficiency in their men in the process of performing practical work among the troops. The ideological conditioning of the students helps them gain a better mastery of their future job and to orient themselves in the nation's internal life and in international events.

The training and indoctrinational process is sensibly planned, a precisely defined system for teaching the social, natural, military and technical sciences has been developed and a good equipment and materials base has been created at the academy. All of the work involved in preparing military engineers is directed and coordinated by command, the political section and party organizations of the schools, departments and sections. A comprehensive plan for the ideological and political indoctrination of the students is worked out for each academic year in the political section. The different schools compile their own corresponding plans in accordance with it. The departments also plan the indoctrinational work carried out with the students.

All of these plans stress the thorough study of the theoretical heritage of the classics on Marxism-Leninism, materials from the 25th CPSU Congress, other party documents and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. A scientific and theoretical conference conducted at the academy to discuss issues pertaining to the practical realization of requirements set by the comprehensive approach in the training and indoctrinational process was extremely beneficial with respect to providing professors and instructors with methodological guidelines. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Comprehensive Resolution of Questions of Ideological and Indoctrinational Work by the Orsk Gorkom of the CPSU" has been studied and discussed in all party organizations. Attempting to fulfill the party's requirements as completely as possible, we seek new ways and forms for employing the comprehensive approach in our work.

We regard implementation of Leninist principles as the main way to make ideological measures more effective. The most important of these is the principle of party-mindedness and a class approach to ideological and indoctrinational work. "...Party-mindedness," V. I. Lenin said, "is at the same time both a condition and an indicator of political development" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 32, p 190). The indoctrinational effect upon the students of all the disciplines taught at the academy is directly dependent upon party-mindedness in teaching them.

The essence of the party principle is clear to all instructors. How can this principle be applied in the presentation of the specific subject, in

a specific class, however--this presents difficulties not only for the young instructors but for the experienced ones as well. With this in mind, the political section, together with the social science departments, prepared and conducted a scientific and practical conference on "Party-Mindedness in Teaching the Military, Military-Engineering and General Science Disciplines." Questions pertaining to party-mindedness in teaching were discussed at a meeting of the academy council and at training methods assemblies. As a result, every department now has a specific system of methods for implementing the principle of party-mindedness in the teaching of this or that discipline. These systems consist of three sections. The first tells what the party principle consists of, the second defines the indoctrinational objectives of the class and the third contains a list of recommended literature on each subject.

Stimulating independent ideological and theoretical training on the part of professors and instructors, in combination with increased methodological work to implement the party principle, produces good results. In their lectures in the military and special disciplines, for example, professors on our staff major general of engineer troops M. Kozlov and Colonels N. Fedotov and T. Salamakhin, docents major general of engineer troops G. Shevchenko and Colonels R. Dubrovin and A. Lylin, and others skillfully explained the military-political significance of the issues under discussion and how they are connected with the basic principles of Marxism-Lenism, party and government decisions, issues pertaining to the scientific and technological revolution and the life of the nation and the Armed Forces. The military departments frequently interact closely with the Department of History of the CPSU and Party-Political Work, jointly defining the indoctrinational objectives of the classes. During tactical and command post exercises conducted in the area where battles were fought near Moscow, for example, meetings are conducted at monuments to heroes of the capital's defense, which further the military-patriotic indoctrination of the students and the development of good morale and fighting efficiency.

Instruction based on the party principle requires overall intensification of the world-outlook focus. And this applies not just to the social sciences. The experience of Professor A. Sinitsyn, honored worker in science and technology of the RSFSR, and professors L. Dashkevich and A. Babayan, whose classes in mathematics, physics, chemistry and theoretical mechanics always touch upon questions enlarging the dialectical-materialistic perspective of the students and give them the ability to expose the lack of a scientific basis and the reactionary nature of idealistic views and concepts, has received recognition here at the academy. The general science and special disciplines also provide the opportunity to demonstrate the prestige and the achievements of Soviet science and technology.

The art of implementing the party principles requires that an instructor be both thoroughly informed politically and able to find a "bridge" for linking the topics studied with the most important party decisions and

urgent problems of today. In the discussion of the physical principles underlying the creation of nuclear weapons, which are studied in the course on protection against weapons of mass destruction, for example, it is appropriate to demonstrate the significance of the campaign continuously and systematically waged by the CPSU and the Soviet Government to ban such weapons.

Marxist-Leninist theory has always formed the basis for the development of ideological conviction and for the professional training of military specialists. As we organize the teaching of the social disciplines, we proceed from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's instruction to the effect that "it is only possible creatively to master the specialty and to become an active participant in our building of communism and an agent of party policy among the masses by mastering Marxist-Leninist theory. The teaching of Marxism-Leninism is an integral component of the specialist's knowledge in any field" ("Leninskim kursom" [On A Leninist Course], vol 3, p 429).

We strive first of all to further improve the content of the classes and to perfect the methods employed and to raise the pedagogical level of the instructors. In recent years, we have been able to step up considerably the ideological-indoctrinational and scientific research of the social science departments. Theoretical seminars and conferences on the most pressing problems of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice, of the international communist movement and Soviet military organizational development, have become firmly established in their work. The instructors regularly take part in All-Union and regional scientific symposiums and seminars and maintain close creative links with Moscow's leading scientific establishments and educational institutions.

The departments give constant attention to the scientific and methodological growth of the instructors, discussing dissertations, reports and papers. In their methodological projects they try to single out the world-outlook and the logical-epistemological aspects of the teaching of this or that specific discipline. The problem-focus method of instruction is being adopted more and more actively at the academy. The advantage of this method, we believe, lies in the fact that the raising of specific problem issues in a lecture or at a seminar orients the students not toward the mechanical memorization of ready conclusions but toward independent, creative comprehension of both theoretical principles and the facts of reality.

Strong staff teams have developed in the social science departments. Social science instructors Major General N. Popov and Colonels Ye. Vasil'yev, N. Arisov, M. Pletushkov, M. Khitrenko and V. Savitskiy enjoy great prestige among the students. Their lectures are distinguished by great ideological content, demonstration and intelligibility. They explain complex theoretical issues with political acuity and practical meaning and organically weave current military problems and criticism of bourgeois, reformist and revisionist concepts into the substance of a subject or a section of a course.

At the same time, we have to admit that the lectures of certain instructors are still weak in their coverage of aspects of CPSU military policy, do not adequately reveal the party's concern for outfitting the Soviet Armed Forces and the engineer troops with first-rate weapons and military equipment, and analyze problems of military economics on a superficial level. They sometimes lack well-reasoned, politically severe criticism of the views of bourgeois military theoreticians and falsifiers, Maoists and Zionists on matters of war and peace. We regard elimination of these deficiencies as an important condition for improving all ideological-indoctrinational work.

The academy must provide its students as well with skills in organizing and conducting ideological-indoctrinational work. During command post and tactical exercises and practical training in the forces, the instructors teach the students how to work with people and demonstrate the place and role of the commander and chief in the engineer troops in the ideological-political indoctrination of personnel under the conditions of modern combat.

Participation by academy students in All-Union competitions involving student projects on problems of the social sciences are one effective means of broadening their political knowledge and developing in them a desire to study revolutionary theory on their own. The political section and the departments organize and direct this work. We make an effort to have the students who have written the best reports present them in some auditorium and to see that they acquire not only scientific research skills but also the qualities required by a good propagandist. The opinion expressed by Engineer-Senior Lieutenant V. Ivanov, a graduate of the academy, is typical in this respect. "During my very first days in the service," he said, "I had to enter into the military collective, to learn its mood and interests and to disclose myself, so to speak. I was asked to deliver a report on 'The Embodiment of Leninist Principles on Protecting the Socialist Homeland in the Constitution of the USSR.' I was nervous before I spoke, but I then had a feeling of satisfaction: The report was successful. I feel that this helped me considerably to enter into the collective fairly rapidly, to become close with the men. I began to understand that I could hardly hope to become established rapidly within the new military collective without the knowledge acquired at the academy, without my participation in competitions on social science problems and without the experience I acquired in performing propaganda work."

We are now attempting to draw as many students as possible into the 8th All-Union Competition of Student Projects devoted to the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin. The academy's participation in this competition will unquestionably contribute to the further improvement of the communist indoctrination of military specialists and help convert the political knowledge acquired by the students into profound personal convictions and an active posture in life.

With respect to the organization of the indoctrinational process, we have to admit that the requirements for a comprehensive approach have still not been fully met. Far from all of the commanders, political workers and instructors have accepted the comprehensive approach as a broad and multi-faceted category or are fully aware of its specific application within the walls of a military educational institution. It should be stressed in connection with this that the principle of comprehensiveness is not the same as the usual stepping up of ideological and indoctrinational efforts. It is a qualitatively new method of organizing the entire indoctrinational process, one which places great responsibility and requires great seriousness on the part of every communist. Experience has shown that it is not enough simply to compile a good over-all plan. The most important thing is to implement it fully.

The enormous role performed by the military work in the communist indoctrination of personnel in the army and navy is well known. Certain instructors still fail to provide an adequate logical basis when explaining the indoctrinational role of labor to the students, however. Because of this, one sometimes encounters situations like the following, for example, in field exercises. A subunit has been assigned the task of performing the engineer equipment work in a defense area. Proper party-political work is conducted with the personnel. The soldiers spare no effort to complete the task on time, knowing that this is necessary for the successful conduct of the battle. And the area is equipped. The men are tired, but are happily excited by the knowledge that they have performed their duty. The senior engineer chief, however, a graduate of our academy, decides that the wrong site has been selected. In the presence of all the personnel he orders the strong point to be moved. At the new site, the same work is performed with apathy, the norms are not met and the men are discouraged.

It could all have been otherwise, however. It would only have been necessary, let us say, to insert into the situation a hypothetical problem such as a transfer of artillery fire by the enemy. The need to set up the strong point at a new site would then have been received by the men as a logical part of the training, and the new engineering task would have been performed with the same zeal and liveliness as it was the first time. I feel that all these subtleties of military psychology and pedagogical tact should be better taught at the academy so that our graduates, no matter what service positions they achieve, have a clear picture of the determining role of cognizant military work in the development of good ideological and political qualities, morale and fighting efficiency in the soldiers.

Moral indoctrination has a special place with respect to effecting an overall influence upon the awareness of the students. Nothing elevates the individual, it was pointed out at our party's 25th congress, like an active posture in life and an attitude of awareness toward one's duty to society, when unity of word and deed become the daily standard of behavior. It is the job of moral indoctrination to develop such an outlook. Military service, for both academy students and fighting men of the Soviet Army in

general, is a civil duty and an honored obligation. We consider precise and strict observance of all the requirements contained in the regulations to be the main criterion of a military engineer's moral maturity.

A peculiarity of moral indoctrination lies in the fact that it seems "to penetrate" into all other areas of communist indoctrination and is therefore an indivisible part of them. This makes it essential to see and consider the moral aspects of the political, the military, the aesthetic and the physical indoctrination of the students. Experience has shown that even slight gaps in the ideological-political and military training of the military specialist is a significant detriment to his moral conditioning. Today's academy student makes great demands of the organization and the substance of every activity and of the methods employed to conduct it. Unfortunately, certain comrades still permit themselves to perform indoctrinational measures in a formal manner, "for the record." Unconvincing facts are sometimes used in lectures on the international situation. The very ones responsible for indoctrination sometimes say one thing but do another, say one thing when they are in public and another when they are alone. Such duplicity is not encountered frequently, but it should evoke resolute condemnation in us every time.

The vast majority of students, professors and instructors at the academy demonstrate great principle in combating deficiencies, daring in their training and their work and a party approach to the appraisal of objective reality. An indicator of the increased moral maturity of the students is the fact that they themselves, "without prompting," demonstrate great interest in the development of an active posture in life in each member of the team and an aware attitude toward the performance of his military duty. An atmosphere has been created in the school headed by Major General Yu. Dorofeyev, for example, which increases the moral authority and force of the team's indoctrinational influence. The comrades hold strictly accontable not only those who are not studying to the best of their abilities but also those who are eloquent on the speaker's platform but avoid becoming involved in public work and those who are reluctant to help a comrade. The success rate has improved significantly in the school as a result, practically all of the students are involved in public assignments and more than half of them are active in military-scientific work and submit proposals for improving efficiency.

Mass agitation work occupies an important place in our system of ideological means. Based on vital contact with the people, it makes it possible to demonstrate the nation's success in the building of communism, using clear and concrete facts and examples, to explain party policy, to influence the development of socialist competition at the academy and increase the public activeness of the students in a focused manner and to reach every individual with the party word. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Current Issues in CPSU Ideological Work] and "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism] and his

memoirs "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth], and "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands] are an invaluable aid in communist indoctrination. They teach us the art of human communication, how to grasp the essence of real problems of life, and the ability to indoctrinate reliable defenders of our homeland effectively and purposively.

Aesthetic indoctrination has an important role in developing a well-rounded individual. The academy is located in Moscow, a leading center of world culture. Furthermore, the academy itself is a solid cultural institution: its library contains around a million books. Our museum houses exhibits telling about the academy's glorious and interesting history.

At one time, we thought that officers arriving to study at the academy would naturally be drawn to these cultural treasures and enrich their knowledge. Several years ago, however, when the political section analyzed the aesthetic level of graduates leaving to join the troops, the findings were considerably lower than we had expected. Many of the students rarely visited Moscow's museums, theaters, art galleries and other attractions. They had a poor understanding of music and paintings, and their spiritual growth was slow. We demanded that the aesthetic indoctrination work be thoroughly restructured. We began to arrange and conduct various mass cultural activities with greater consideration. We now have close sponsorship links, for example, with the State Academic Great Theater of the USSR, whose actors perform for personnel at the academy. Together with the TsDSA [Central Club of the Soviet Army], we regularly organize evenings devoted to special subjects at the young officer's club. The academy library has begun to conduct readers' conferences and meetings with writers and poets more frequently.

The political section's plans now provide for all of the students to visit the V. I. Lenin and the K. Marx and S. Engels museums and the Armed Forces Museum during their period of study. Certain classes and seminars for the party and Komsomol aktiv are conducted at the museum. A readers' conference on Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's book "Malaya zemlya" was held at the 18th Army's museum. A meeting with the students and the companions-in-arms of Academician S. P. Korolev was held in the home of the famous scientist, which is now a museum.

The academy celebrates its 160th anniversary in December of this year. Socialist competition has been launched to greet this date in a fitting manner. It will help to improve the training of the students and contribute to their indoctrination in the glorious fighting traditions of the engineer troops.

We are thus employing the comprehensive approach in ideological and political and indoctrinational work, attempting to prepare military specialists

with a solid Marxist-Leninist world outlook, profound ideological conviction, selfless devotion to the Communist Party and the people, and a highly-developed sense of personal responsibility for the socialist homeland's defense.

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INDOCTRINATION OUTLINE: LENIN AND PARTY LEADERSHIP

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 79 signed to press 5 Nov 79 pp 66-74

[Outline "for instructors of group political classes" prepared by Col I. Tikhankov: "V. I. Lenin--Leader of the October Revolution, Founder of the First Socialist State in the World"]

[Excerpts] The study of this subject is scheduled to coincide with a glorious anniversary, the 110th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin.

In this class, the students will be able to gain an even deeper awareness of V. I. Lenin's enormous role as the leader of the October Revolution and the founder of the world's first socialist state, and to become inspired with a sense of great personal responsibility for the defense of socialism's accomplishments and for the cause of peace and progress among nations.

Of the 4 hours scheduled for this subject, 2 hours should be designated for a lecture (or narration) and 2 for a seminar (or discussion). It is preferable that the students' independent work be set up for evenings.

It is recommended that the following basic topics be covered in the lecture (or narrative): 1. V. I. Lenin--Leader of the October Revolution; 2. V. I. Lenin--Founder of the World's First Socialist State; 3. The CPSU--Proven Leader of the Soviet People In the Struggle for a Victory of Communism.

It should be pointed out in a brief word of introduction that all of V. I. Lenin's work was directed toward the ideological, political and organizational preparation of the working class to fight for a victorious socialist revolution. Vladimir Il'ich could clearly see that World War I, unleashed by international imperialism, was bringing the revolution nearer with enormous speed. Speaking on the Russian Revolution of 1905 at a 9 January 1917 meeting of young workers in Zurich, he stated: "Europe is ripe for revolution. The monstrous horrors of the imperialist war and the

torment of high prices are creating a mood of revolution everywhere, and the ruling classes... are getting deeper and deeper into a corner from which they will not be able to escape without great upheavals" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 30, p 327).

These words proved to be prophetic. Slightly more than a month later, the revolution in Russia began. The tsarist monarchy fell under the onslaught of the people at the end of February 1917. The tireless and courageous work of the Bolshevik party headed by V. I. Lenin, which had fought fearlessly against the tsarist regime for many years, had borne fruit. The monarchy, which had suppressed the people for centuries, was swept away.

In the first part of March, this exciting news reached Switzerland, where V. I. Lenin was forced to live at that time. The propagandist can remind the students that Vladimir Il'ich was an emigrant for many years, in hiding from the tsar's secret political police. It is important at this point to underscore the fact that V. I. Lenin was never out of touch with the life of his native country, with the revolutionary struggle being waged by its people. He thoroughly developed the theory of socialist revolution in his works "Dve taktiki sotsial-demokratii v demokraticheskoy revolyutsii" [Two Tactics of Social Democracy in a Democratic Revolution], "Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma" [Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism], "Voyennaya programa proletarskoy revolyutsii" [The Military Program of Proletarian Revolution] and others. Now, the first stage of the revolution had been carried out in Russia and V. I. Lenin precisely defined Bolshevik tactics for the struggle to turn the bourgeois-democratic revolution in a socialist revolution in his famous "Letters From Afar" published in PRAVDA in March 1917.

Vladimir Il'ich was anxious to return to Russia in order to take a personal part in the revolution. It was impossible to travel through the Entente nations, however. He decided to reach the homeland by way of Germany. Negotiations were conducted, with representatives of the Swiss workers' movement acting as intermediaries, and he was permitted to make the trip. Under the terms of the special agreement, immunity was promised for V. I. Lenin and for the other political emigres traveling in the same car with him.

On 27 March 1917, Vladimir Il'ich left Berne. On the morning of 31 March he arrived in Stockholm. He did not remain there a single hour longer than necessary but left for Russia that same evening. For many years the leader of the Bolshevik party, forced to remain out of his country for many years, returned to his homeland in order to take direct charge of the struggle being waged by the workers and peasants for a victorious socialist revolution.

3. The CPSU--Proven Leader Of The Soviet People In The Struggle For A Victory Of Communism

The Leninist Communist Party of the Soviet Union has traveled a difficult and glorious path of struggle and victory. "As we look back today," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has commented, "we cannot help admiring the deeds of Lenin and his comrades-in-arms, who created our party, the first party of its type in history, and took it through the barricades of 1905 to February 1917, from February 1917 to the victory of the October Revolution, in defiance of all the furor created by the enemies."

The exploiter classes and the factors causing man's exploitation of man were eliminated under the party's leadership. Socialist industrialization and collectivization of agriculture were carried out within an extremely short period of time, and the nation was turned into a mighty socialist power with highly developed science and a high level of culture.

The party organized and provided the inspiration for the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War and for the successful restoration of the war-devastated economy. The historic military feat performed by the Soviet people during the war years, their subsequent labor heroism and the extremely valuable experience acquired in party work during those years are brilliantly described in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth] and "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands].

The greatest result of the party's work and of the people's selfless labor over a period of more than 60 years of Soviet power has been the building of a developed socialist society, the accomplishments of which are set down in the Fundamental Law of the nation, the Constitution of the USSR adopted on 7 October 1977.

Our party achieved all of this primarily because of its unshakable fidelity to Marxism-Leninism. "Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine," the Constitution of the USSR states, "the Communist Party determines the general long-range plan for the development of society and the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR, directs the great creative work of the Soviet people and provides a planned and scientifically-based quality."

The CPSU, which now has around 17 million members, is the militant advance guard of the entire Soviet people. At the 25th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev underscored the fact that the party is performing its function as leader of the working class, of all the workers and of the entire people in a worthy manner.

The resolution of key problems in the theoretical and practical build-up of the state in the stage of developed socialism and in-depth analysis of the changes occurring in the class character of the state constitute a historic

service of the Communist Party. The conclusion, which has been recorded in recent party documents and is set down in our nation's Fundamental Law, is that the Soviet State, having completed the tasks required for a dictatorship of the proletariat, has become a state of all the people. A dictatorship of the proletariat is a necessary stage in the process of creating and developing socialism. A state of dictatorship of the proletariat is at the same time a historically transitional development. After the tasks involved in building developed socialism have been completed, it naturally turns into a socialist state of all the people.

It should be pointed out that from the very first days of its existence our state has brought peace to the world and has campaigned consistently against wars of aggression. The Constitution of the USSR proclaims that the Soviet State steadfastly pursues a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, works to strengthen the security of nations and promotes extensive international cooperation.

War is an important condition for implementing the great plans involved in the building of communism. Our party, its Leninist Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally perform an enormous amount of work to insure external conditions conducive to our nation's development. The Program of Peace worked out at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses is being implemented actively and consistently.

The noble objectives of our foreign policy and the persistent struggle being waged to implement them in international relations are strengthening mankind's faith in world socialism and helping to unite the forces of peace and to reinforce the positive changes which have occurred on the planet in recent years.

The meeting in Vienna between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and U.S. President J. Carter was an extremely important event for the world. The most important result of that meeting was the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT-II).

The political significance of the SALT-II Agreement goes beyond the important strategic military issues directly involved. Its practical implementation could open up the way to further progress in arms reductions, normalization of the international climate and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social structures.

The proposals made public by L. I. Brezhnev in Berlin are convincing proof of the Soviet State's love of peace. Leonid Il'ich announced our willingness to reduce the present number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western areas of our nation, with the condition that additional American medium-range nuclear weapons would not be placed in Western Europe.

After consulting with its allies and with their agreement, the Soviet Union made the decision unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops stationed in the GDR. Within the next 12 months the USSR is to remove up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks and a certain quantity of other military equipment.

The Soviet Union has offered not to conduct joint military exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 men and to announce large-scale ground exercises not 3 weeks but 1 month in advance and beginning at a level of 20,000 and not 25,000 men, as well as movements of ground forces totaling more than 20,000 men.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, the USSR is prepared to consider other ideas aimed at strengthening trust among states and at reducing the danger of war in Europe.

U.S. leaders are also, at least verbally, promoting the development of peaceful cooperation among states. Their practical actions, however, frequently indicate the opposite: They are building up an atmosphere of fear, whipping up the arms race and openly making military preparations. "...The facts demonstrate," points out Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, "that it is precisely NATO and the United States, taking cover behind the nonexistent 'Soviet military threat,' which are constantly building up their arsenal of weapons aimed at the Soviet Union."

The policy of China's present leaders coincides directly with the position of the most extreme reactionary forces. The ideology and policy of Maoism are thoroughly alien to Marxism-Leninism, to the cause of peace and the liberation struggle being waged by peoples. China's armed aggression against socialist Vietnam was one extreme manifestation of this policy.

In a difficult international situation, our party and government are making the efforts necessary to further strengthen the nation's defense capability and to improve the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Soviet Army and Navy personnel, together with fighting men of the fraternal armies of members of the Warsaw Pact, are performing their duty with vigilance and alertness and persistently improving their military skill, attempting to greet the 110th anniversary of the birth V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of our Victory in the Great Patriotic War in a worthy manner. Our Army and Navy, inseparably linked with the people and directed by the Leninist party, have always been and remain a loyal protector of the accomplishments of the October Revolution and the cause of peace and socialism. As the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political and Indoctrinational Work" points out, service in the Army and Navy provides a remarkable school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship.

As the presentation of this subject comes to an end, the fact should be stressed once more that the Bolshevik party created by V. I. Lenin led Russia's working class and the working masses skillfully and resolutely along the unknown path of revolutionary reforms which completely altered the historical destinies of our nation and the entire world. "We have not yet achieved communism," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated from the speaker's platform at the 25th CPSU Congress. "It is apparent to the entire world, however, that our party's actions and its aspirations are aimed at accomplishing everything essential to the welfare of man, for the sake of man" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 88). Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the leader of this struggle and of the world's first socialist state, devoted his life to this noble goal. Our party is ever loyal to his banner.

During the hours of independent group study, it is most of all important to see that all of the students read the sections "Leader of the October Revolution" and "Founder of the World's First Socialist State" in the book "V. I. Lenin. Kratkiy biograficheskiy ocherk" [V. I. Lenin: A Brief Biographical Sketch], as well as the speech and the first section of the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee "K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina" [On the 100th Anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin].

Part of the instruction time and outside work should be devoted to reading the memoirs of N. K. Krupskaya G. K. Ordzhonikidze, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, N. I. Podvoyskiy and others of the leader's closest comrades-in-arms, in the book "Lenin v 1917 godu" [Lenin in 1917] and other collections.

It is recommended that certain of the films on V. I. Lenin be shown for the fighting men in the clubs during their study of this subject: the feature films "Lenin in October," "Stories About Lenin," "The Blue Notebook," "Man With a Weapon," "The 6th of July" and "Red Square"; the popular science films "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," "From February to October," "The Shot from the Avrora," and "Lenin in Smol'nyy"; the documentary films: "Lenin Alive" and "Film Documents on V. I. Lenin"; and the filmstrips "V. I. Lenin's Last Resistance," "At the Rudder of the Revolution" and "The Party: Inspirer and Organizer of the Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

Whenever possible, trips should be scheduled to museums and to exhibits devoted to the life of V. I. Lenin, as well as meetings with veterans of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The following topics are recommended for the seminar (or discussion): 1. V. I. Lenin's historic role as the leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution; 2. The outstanding importance of V. I. Lenin's work in the creation of the Soviet State, the world's first state of workers and peasants; 3. What successes has our nation achieved by following the Communist Party's lead along the path mapped out by V. I. Lenin? 4. How is the loyalty of Soviet fighting men to Lenin's legacy demonstrated?

During the discussion of the topics covered under this subject, it is advised that the students be led not only to bring out certain facts about V. I. Lenin's life and revolutionary activities, but also to attempt to reveal the outstanding features of Vladimir Il'ich, who combined political wisdom and insight with organizational talent, his unfaltering conviction that socialism would be victorious, his iron will, courage and boldness, and his inexhaustible energy and constant contact with the masses.

This entire class is designed to develop in our fighting men an even greater love for the Communist Party and its great leader and teacher and a fervent desire to carry out Lenin's behests.

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INDOCTRINATION OUTLINE: LENIN'S TEACHINGS ON DEFENSE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 79 signed to press 5 Nov 79 pp 75-83

[Outline "for instructors of group political classes" prepared by Col V. Bokarev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent: "Leninist Teachings on Defense of the Achievements of Socialism"[1]]

[Excerpts] This is the second subject scheduled to coincide with the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin. It is organically linked to and is a continuation of the previous subject: "V. I. Lenin—Leader of the October Revolution, Founder of the World's First Socialist State." The study of this subject will help the fighting men to grasp more thoroughly the Leninist doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland and the main lines of CPSU military policy in the world of today. The class is also designed to help strengthen the sense of personal responsibility on the part of soldiers and sailors for achieving a thorough mastery of military affairs and for further improving the vigilance and combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships.

A total of 4 hours is scheduled for this subject. It is advisable to divide the time into 2 hours for lecturing (narration) and 2 for a seminar (or discussion). It is recommended that the independent training of the students be scheduled in the evening.

In the lecture (or narration), it is important to focus the fighting men's attention upon the following basic topics: 1. V. I. Lenin on protecting the socialist homeland; 2. Lenin's Doctrine on Protecting the Conquests of Socialism--The Basis of CPSU Military Policy; 3. It is the patriotic and international duty of every Soviet fighting man to observe as something sacred V. I. Lenin's behests and the Communist Party's requirements with respect to vigilance and combat readiness.

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1. Material for political classes on the subject: "Lenin's doctrine on defending the conquests of socialism and his development of the Communist Party under contemporary conditions.

A brief word of introduction must point out the fact that the Soviet people led by the CPSU are successfully fulfilling the historic decisions coming out of the 25th CPSU Congress and are preparing to celebrate the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, the great successor to K. Marx and F. Engels, leader of the Communist Party and founder of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces. At this point, it is important to underscore the fact that V. I. Lenin thoroughly substantiated the importance of military matters in the class struggle of the proletariat under the new historical conditions, relying upon the theoretical principles set forth by the founders of scientific communism. He provided an in-depth analysis of the main patterns and peculiarities of modern wars and the most important conditions for reliably defending the socialist homeland, and worked out the scientific principles underlying CPSU military policy.

History has vividly confirmed the great vitality of Lenin's ideas. The need to defend socialism against encroachments by its enemies is one of the laws governing the building of socialism. "At all stages of the socialist state's development," the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee "K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina" [On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin] stress, "protecting the conquests of socialism against encroachments by counterrevolutionary and world imperialist forces has been and remains a matter of vital importance to him." The Communist Party and the Soviet Government are doing everything within their power reliably to insure the nation's security and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people against the intrigues of the reactionary forces of imperialism and its henchmen.

1. V. I. Lenin On Defending the Socialist Homeland

When he begins presenting the material on the second topic, the instructor should focus attention upon providing the students with a thorough understanding of the concept "homeland." Marxism-Leninism teaches us that homeland is a historical concept. It embraces a given social, political and cultural environment, the language and the territory on which one or several ethnic groups or nations have long resided. The sociopolitical nature of a homeland depends upon which class is dominant in the society.

After thoroughly analyzing the exploitative nature of the capitalist society, K. Marx and F. Engels concluded that under capitalism the workers do not have their own homeland and corroborated the proletariat's tasks to gain a real homeland, a homeland of the workers.

V. I. Lenin proved that this conclusion of the founders of scientific communism retains its full validity and importance for the capitalist nations in the era of imperialism. He wrote that the homeland, that is, a given political, cultural and social environment, constitutes the most powerful factor in the proletariat's class struggle (see "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 17, p 190). V. I. Lenin pointed out that the proletariat was faced with the task of destroying bourgeois homelands and building

socialism. "...Only the destruction of bourgeois homelands," underscored Vladimir Il'ich, "can give the workers of all nations a 'bond with the earth,' freedom to use their native language, a peace of bread and the benefits of culture" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 26, p 124).

2. Lenin's Doctrine on Defending the Conquests of Socialism--The Foundation of CPSU Military Policy

In his presentation of the second topic, the instructor points out the fact that Lenin's doctrine on defending socialism's conquests has formed the foundation for the Communist Party's policy in strengthening the nation's defense capability and in the organizational development of the Armed Forces throughout the Soviet State's history. CPSU military policy is essentially the party's activity to strengthen the Soviet State's defense capability, to direct its military organization and to outfit the Armed Forces with everything necessary and train them to reliably defend socialism's conquests.

V. I. Lenin's instructions on the necessity for and the nature and purpose of an army of the victorious proletariat and on defending the socialist homeland became the foundation for the Communist Party's organizational development of the Soviet State's Armed Forces. The Communist Party led by V. I. Lenin created a new socialist army and organized the defense of the Soviet Republic under the extremely difficult circumstances of civil war, foreign military intervention and economic ruin, with the old army demoralized and a lack of experience in military organizational development. "...We proceeded in accordance with what Marxism had taught us," said V. I. Lenin ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 38, p 138). The party remembered the experience of the Paris Commune, which fell only because it did not make adequate use of armed force at the right time ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 35, p 281).

Creation of the socialist state's army was the greatest historical service performed by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party. Workers and peasants of the Soviet Republic placed their armed force against a violent offensive by international imperialism and internal counterrevolution and resolutely rose to the socialist homeland's defense.

We were not alone during those terrible years. The Soviet Republic and its army received a great deal of assistance from their class brothers abroad. Many thousands of them fought in the ranks of the Red Army. The working class and workers of the capitalist nations restrained the forces of counterrevolution and weakened the thrust of the imperialist interventionists with determined actions to the slogan: "Hands off Soviet Russia"!

During the war, the Communist Party worked out a smoothly coordinated system of military, economic, political and ideological measures permitting it to fully mobilize all the nation's forces for victory. The Appeal of the

2d Congress of Soviets of the USSR (1924) "To Working Mankind" states that V. I. Lenin was the greatest military leader of all nations, of all times and all peoples. He was a military leader of a new race of man liberating the world.

The first battle waged against world imperialism was won. It vividly confirmed the correctness and the profoundly vital nature of Lenin's doctrine on defending socialism's conquests. "From beginning to end, the struggle against internal counterrevolution and foreign interventionists," the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committe "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" states, "demonstrated that a revolution can only consolidate its victory when it is capable of defending itself."

Implementation of the 1924-25 military reform was an important step in the party's military policy during the period of peaceful socialist development. In view of the specific historical situation the party continued to develop Lenin's doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland. Restoration of the USSR national economy and the Soviet people's successful fulfillment of the first five-year plans provided the party with a solid material foundation for its military policy and broad moral-political possibilities for implementing the policy. Socialist industrialization and collectivization, the cultural revolution and the just resolution of the nationality question turned our homeland into a mighty socialist power within a historically brief period of time. The sociopolitical and ideological unity of the Soviet society, confirmed by the victory of socialism, created the foundation for indoctrinating for the Army and Navy fighting men of strong moral fiber, with infinite devotion to the party and the people, and prepared to defend the conquests of socialism at any cost.

During the years of peaceful socialist development, our people were forced more than once to take up arms to uphold the integrity of their socialist state and to defend the inviolability of Soviet borders. The Red Army dealt a crushing defeat to the Chinese militarists who initiated an armed conflict on the KVZhD [Chinese Eastern Railroad] in 1929 and to the Japanese imperialists near Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939.

The party Central Committee laid special emphasis upon building up the nation's defenses and further improving the Soviet Armed Forces. The most important principles of the Communist Party's military policy were creatively developed in congress decisions and in decrees passed by the party Central Committee.

During the prewar years, the party successfully performed the tasks involved in completing the building of socialism. Along with the entire nation, the Red Army developed and grew stronger. Fundamental reorganization and technical reoutfitting of the army were accomplished on the basis of achievements in the building of socialism. The general education level and the combat and political training of the personnel improved rapidly. The

training of the personnel improved rapidly. The training of regular military personnel improved. Soviet military science and military art underwent further development.

The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War against fascist Germany and imperialist Japan was the largest armed action by the striking forces of world imperialism against socialism and one of the gravest ordeals ever experienced by our homeland. The fate of the world's first socialist state and the future of world civilization, progress and democracy was determined in that war.

The Communist Party led the Soviet people's fight for their homeland's freedom and independence. Steadfastly following Lenin's behests with respect to the need for unity of political, economic and military leadership and to the inseparability of tasks performed on the front and in the rear, it united the army and the people into a single whole. The war fought against the fascist invaders was truly a patriotic war. With the party's slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" the nation became a single, powerful military camp. The State Defense Committee, with I. V. Stalin as chairman, was created to mobilize all forces to repel and rout the enemy.

The party extensively publicized V. I. Lenin's concepts, which were explained in works written during the period of civil war and foreign intervention. "Voyennaya perepiska V. I. Lenina perioda grazhdanskoy voyny" [V. I. Lenin's Wartime Correspondence During the Civil War Period] by decision of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party, Bolshevik] Central Committee. V. I. Lenin's works contained the basic principles for defending the socialist homeland, for building up the Red Army and for its indoctrination and armament, and for building up the rear and organizing assistance for the front.

Loyal to the overwhelmingly convincing principles of Marxism-Leninism, our party directed the Soviet people's armed struggle in the Great Patriotic War with foresight and wisdom and found the best possible ways to achieve victory over the fascist aggressors. The party was the real inspiring force behind and the organizer of the defeat of imperialism's most reactionary forces. "During the longest and most difficult war in our homeland's history," states a decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," "the Soviet people accomplished a feat the equal of which mankind has never known. They were able not only to defend their freedom and independence but also made a decisive contribution to the deliverance of European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians."

The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War gave the USSR even greater prestige and international status and opened up new possibilities for building up the forces of peace, democracy and socialism. It convincingly demonstrated the correctness of V. I. Lenin's prediction that

the Soviet Republic would withstand all attacks by hostile forces and would stand firm as a flaming torch of international socialism and as an example to all the working masses.

After the war, the party's military policy underwent further development in decisions adopted at party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. It was based on Lenin's doctrine on defending the conquests of socialism and on a thorough study of the Great Patriotic War and took into account the frenzied arms race in which the imperialist states were engaged. The continuing existence of a military threat on the part of imperialism forced the Communist Party unceasingly to build up the Soviet State's defense capability and improve its military organization. Party military policy focused upon creating nuclear missiles, equipping the Army and Navy with them, developing conventional weapons, working out a new organizational structure for the Armed Forces and methods and forms of combat operations, and further improving party-political work.

The formation of a number of socialist states in the postwar period called for further internationalization of CPSU military policy. It began coordinating its military-political and defense measures with those of other fraternal socialist nations for the joint defense of world socialism.

Under developed socialism, our party has taken a creative approach for determining the role and place of the Armed Forces at the contemporary stage. As it builds up the nation's defense, the Communist Party steadfastly follows V. I. Lenin's doctrine on defending the socialist homeland. The basic principles underlying this doctrine are extensively reflected and creatively developed in the Program of the CPSU, decisions of party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, Central Committee decrees, the Constitution of the USSR and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the USSR Defense Council.

In these documents our party has singled out the issue of war and peace as the main issue of modern times. We know that the lives of hundreds of millions of people and the future of all nations depend upon its resolution. The party has pointed out ways to preserve and strengthen peace, defined the social and political forces capable of preventing war and demonstrated the need for great political vigilance in view of the intrigues of aggressive imperialist groups and their henchmen.

Imperialism's aggressive nature is manifested in the most diverse forms in the contemporary situation. Imperialism is initiating local wars, organizing all kinds of military conflicts, continuing the arms race and seeking new allies to alter the balance of power in its favor. The 25th CPSU Congress underscored the fact that "although imperialism's possibilities for acts of aggression have now been considerably curtailed, its

nature remains the same. Peace-loving forces must therefore exercise great vigilance" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 24).

The most reactionary groups in the imperialist states are attempting to stall or at least slow down the process of intensifying international detente and are not giving up their hopes of resolving the international strife with socialism by military means. They are attempting to revive a situation of distrust and brinkmanship in international relations, striving to expand existing aggressive military blocs and to create new ones, and endeavoring to achieve military superiority over the socialist nations. U.S. imperialist groups have assumed the unfit role of instigator and inspirer of such efforts. Under the cover of the false slogan about a "Soviet military threat," they are seeking greater and greater outlays on the arms race and building up militaristic preparations. The United States is increasing its efforts to push its partners in the aggressive NATO bloc also into active militaristic preparations.

It was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress that the policy of China's present leaders exactly coincides with the stance adopted by the most extreme reactionary forces. The Chinese leadership is conducting an expansionist, great-power policy in the world. Beijing revealed the true nature of that policy for all people with its treacherous act of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The policy adventure combined with actual buildups of stocks of weaponry by the imperialist nations makes imperialism today a constant threat to world peace. It would, therefore, be a huge error to underestimate the military danger posed by the reactionary forces of the imperialist states.

The CPSU is constantly guided by the Leninist principle to the effect that a revolution can only consolidate its victory when it is capable of defending itself. This party principle has been specifically identified as applicable to the current situation of conflict between the two social systems, socialism and capitalism. It has demonstrated the objective necessity and the vital importance of close military cooperation among fraternal nations to their collective defense.

The military affiliation of armies of the socialist states is an objective necessity for the armed protection of world socialism's conquests against the intrigues of reactionary imperialist forces. The main objective of the military association of fraternal socialist states is to provide complete security for the socialist nations in the existing situation of two opposite social systems. "The Soviet Union," the Program of the CPSU states, "believes that it has an international duty, together with the other socialist nations, to provide a reliable defense and to insure the security of the entire socialist camp." The International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties held in June 1969 underscored anew the need for a

military affiliation of fraternal nations in the interest of their collective defense. It declared most emphatically that the defense of socialism is the international duty of communists.

The Warsaw Pact is a defense organization of nations in the socialist commonwealth, created to defend the revolutionary conquests of the workers. Its members threaten no one, have no intention of attacking anyone, do not claim the territory of anyone else and do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Creation of the military-political alliance of European socialist nations in 1955 was in response to a step-up in acts of aggression by the imperialist powers, which had set out on a course of direct preparations for a war against the world socialist system and had formed the aggressive NATO bloc in Europe in 1949.

The Warsaw Pact Organization differs fundamentally from any past or present coalition in its essence, objectives and tasks. This alliance, a thoroughly defensive one, reliably serves the cause of peace and socialism. Progressive mankind has more than once had proof as to the correctness and the necessity of concluding the Warsaw Pact and the importance of the function it performs in preserving peace and insuring the security of nations. "The Warsaw Pact," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech delivered on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the GDR, "has become a reliable instrument for our common security and our joint struggle for peace...."

The 25th CPSU Congress spoke out resolutely both against dividing the world into opposing military blocs and against the arms race. "Our position in this matter is well known," the congress stressed. "We must make it perfectly clear, however, that as long as the NATO bloc is retained and as long as militaristic groups pursue the arms race, our nation, together with the other Warsaw Pact members, will continue to strengthen this military-political alliance" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 8). All our experience in the development of world socialism has convinced us that socialism can only become firmly established when the workers are able to defend the revolution against all attacks by the class enemy.

The party strictly follows Lenin's instruction on dialectical unity of economic, scientific and technological, moral-political and military strengths as the main elements of a state's defensive power. This unity has become even closer and more thoroughly multilateral in the contemporary situation. The party has employed an organic combination of achievements of the scientific and technological revolution and the advantages provided by developed socialism to work out an economic strategy and a program of social reforms to promote the building of communism. Their realization is reliably supporting and building up the nation's defense capability.

The developed socialist society is an extremely complex social union of economic, sociopolitical, scientific and technological and spiritual processes. It is creating new possibilities for continuing to build up the nation's economic, scientific and technological, moral-political and military strengths.

Considering the increased capabilities of the Soviet national economy, the 25th CPSU Congress specifically defined and developed the fundamental principles underlying the party's economic policy for the developed socialist society for the forthcoming five-year period and beyond that. Under the 10th Five-Year Plan, we are systematically pursuing a course of improving the people's material and cultural standard of living, based on dynamic and balanced development of public production and improved effectiveness, accelerated scientific and technological progress, increased labor productivity and all-round improvement of performance at all levels of the national economy. The core of the party's economic strategy, which runs through both the 10th Five-Year Plan and long-range planning, consists of undeviating build-up of the nation's economic strengths, mainly by expanding and basically renewing productive capital and insuring stable and balanced growth in heavy industry.

Improvement of the USSR's defensive strength is bound up with the nation's large social and political and cultural achievements. A thorough description of these is contained in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," which states: "Developed socialism marks a new level of maturity in the entire system of public relations, which are gradually evolving into communist relations. Inherent in it are indestructible ideological-political and social solidarity of the workers, their selfless devotion to the noble ideals of the Communist Party and loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Developed socialism is the highest attainment in social progress today."

Our nation's economic potential practically doubled between 1967 and 1977. Scientific and technological progess is becoming an increasingly effectual factor in the development of our national economy. The most recent branches of production are developing at outstripping rates. Labor productivity is steadily rising. The materials and equipment base and the economy of the rural area have been fundamentally transformed within a brief period of time. We have come a long way toward resolving the housing problem. Real income of the Soviet people increased 1.6-fold in 10 years. "Never before has our nation possessed such enormous economic and scientific and technological potential," Comrade L, I. Brezhnev stated in his report "Great October and Progress for Mankind" delivered at a joint, formal session of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 2 November 1977. "Never before has its defense capability been so strong and so reliable."

Questions pertaining to the build-up of the nation's defense capability were reflected in decisions coming out of the December 1977 and the November 1978 plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. They reflect firm resolve to do everything necessary to insure that potential aggressors are not tempted to test their strength to resolve the historical conflict between the two opposite social systems in their favor.

The entire history of our state and its Armed Forces provides convincing confirmation that Lenin was correct in concluding that the Communist Party should have the decisive role in military organizational development. It is natural that the role of party leadership of the Armed Forces is steadily increasing.

The Communist Party's supervision of all aspects of the Soviet society's affairs also embraces the military and questions of military organizational development. The pattern of political and organizational leadership of the Armed Forces by the CPSU is a result of the guiding and directing role performed by the party in a socialist state, on the one hand, and by the nature and purpose of a socialist nation's army, on the other. The soundness of the Leninist principle of party supervision over the army is underscored in the Program of the CPSU. It states: "Communist Party leadership of the Armed Forces constitutes the basic principle underlying military organizational development...."

As it successfully accomplishes the tasks involved in building communism, the Communist Party is devoting unweakening attention to the continued strengthening of party leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. "Everything created by the people," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stressed, "must be reliably defended. Strengthening the Soviet State means building up its Armed Forces and strengthening our homeland's defense capability in every way. And as long as we live in a troubled world, this will remain one of the main tasks!" ("Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS," p 81).

Because of the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, our Armed Forces are provided with everything necessary to accomplish their responsible tasks of guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and serving as a bulwark of universal peace. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, states: "The entire world knows that the Soviet Union is not preparing for an armed attack against anyone at all and will never commit such an attack. The entire world is also aware of the fact that the Soviet Army and Navy are in fact in a constant state of readiness to repel an attack by any aggressor, no matter what means or methods of warfare it employs. Retaliation is inevitable for an attack upon the Soviet Union or the other nations in the socialist commonwealth."

The Communist Party has always based its direction of military organizational development on Lenin's instruction that it is an integral part of general development of the state. And it is perfectly natural that the characteristics inherent in the Soviet Armed Forces have undergone further development at the stage of mature socialism. Our Armed Forces are not only a school of combat skill but also a good school of ideological and physical conditioning, discipline and organization. They are the living embodiment of socialist internationalism. Our Armed Forces are a reliable guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and a bulwark of universal peace.

As the presentation of this topic is concluded, the fact should be underscored that Lenin's doctrine on defending the conquests of socialism has served as the basis for CPSU military policy in all the historical stages of Soviet military organizational development. The basic principles underlying this doctrine have undergone additional creative development in the Communist Party's military policy. The Constitution of the USSR states that defense of the socialist homeland is among the most important functions of the state and is a matter for all the people. Inseparably linked to the people and guided by Lenin's party, the Soviet Armed Forces have always been and remain a loyal guard of the socialism's conquests.

3. It is the Patriotic and International Duty of Every Soviet Fighting Man to Observe as Something Sacred V. I. Lenin's Behests and the Communist Party's Requirements with Respect to Vigilance and Combat Readiness

Moving on to the third topic, it is important to stress the fact that the growth of imperialist aggression at the contemporary stage and the intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism vividly demonstrate the fact that imperialism's aggressive nature has not changed. The cutting edge of imperialism's aggressive policy is turned toward the Soviet Union and other nations in the socialist commonwealth. The policy of China's present leadership has actually become an important back-up for imperialism in its campaign against socialism.

Strict and absolute observance of Lenin's behests and the Communist Party's requirements with respect to vigilance, combat readiness and discipline is especially important for fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces in their work of protecting socialism's conquests at a time when imperialism has intensified its reactionary policy. It is the main task of our Armed Forces to remain in a constant state of combat readiness insuring an immediate rebuff for any aggressor.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that international imperialism is prepared to engage in any sort of savagery, brutality or crime to protect the destructive capitalist society and the power of the exploiters. He demanded that we exercise great military vigilance and never forget the threatening danger posed by the reactionary forces of imperialism. "...The first commandment of our policy," said V. I. Lenin, "the first lesson..., which all workers and peasants must learn is to be on guard..." (Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 44, p 296).

V. I. Lenin taught us that to be on guard means strictly observing the laws of revolutionary vigilance, of recognizing, exposing and rendering harmless the designs and actions of the class enemies in their campaign against socialism. He considered the strict guarding of state and military secrets to be an important indicator of vigilance. Vigilance is especially essential in the army of a socialist state. Awareness of this is salient in

Lenin's works such as "Sotsialisticheskoye otechestvo v opasnosti!" [The Socialist Homeland Is In Danger!], "Vse na bor'bu s Denikinym!" [Everyone Into the Battle with Denikin!] and "Pis'mo k rabochim i krest'yanam po povodu pobedy nad Kolchakom" [Letter to the Workers and Peasants On the Occasion of the Victory Over Kolchak]. V. I. Lenin stressed the fact that in the struggle with a treacherous enemy "maximum military discipline and military vigilance are essential" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 39, p 55).

V. I. Lenin's immortal instructions provide a practical guide for every Soviet fighting man in performing the tasks involved in further improving the combat readiness of the Army and Navy. Great vigilance on the part of personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces is one of the main conditions for frustrating the aggressive designs of the enemies of peace and for routing any aggressor promptly and decisively. It is one of the most important elements of combat readiness in the Army and Navy. Soviet fighting men are required strictly to observe the requirements contained in military regulations and the military oath, to be vigilant and to guard strictly military and state secrets.

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin bade Soviet fighting men constantly to improve the army's combat capability and its combat readiness. There is a danger of war as long as world imperialism exists. V. I. Lenin, therefore, told us: "...having set about our peaceful development, we shall exert every effort to continue it without interruption. At the same time, comrades, be on guard, preserve our nation's defense capability and our Red Army's combat capability as though it were our most precious possession..." ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 44, p 300).

Lenin's position with respect to maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces at a high level of combat capability and combat readiness is especially valid in today's situation. "All these years," the 25th CPSU Congress underscored, "the party has given due attention to strengthening our nation's defense capability and improving the Armed Forces.... The degree of equipment of the Armed Forces with modern weapons and combat equipment has increased, and the quality of the combat training and the ideological conditioning of the personnel has improved" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 83).

Combat readiness on the part of units and ships requires a good mastery of the weapons and combat equipment and the improvement of field, naval and air training on the part of the personnel, strengthening the Soviet fighting men ideologically and improving their moral-political and psychological preparedness, and reinforcing military discipline and organization. Consequently, in order for a fighting man to be in a constant state of combat readiness, he must be able to handle the combat equipment and weapons and be an expert in military affairs and in his specialty, ready at any time to come to the defense of the homeland and the other nations in the socialist commonwealth.

Personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces undeviatingly follow Lenin's behests and the Communist Party's instructions and apply all their knowledge and energy to all-round improvement of the Army and Navy's combat capability and combat readiness.

V. I. Lenin bade Soviet fighting men constantly to reinforce military discipline. He regarded Soviet military discipline a special form of overall state discipline. Its nature is determined by the socialist system and by the revolutionary nature of the Armed Forces guarding the conquests of socialism. V. I. Lenin considered a high level of political awareness on the part of fighting men in the Army and Navy to be the unshakable foundation for military discipline. He saw this as the most important source of the socialist state's strength and of the solidarity and organization of its Armed Forces. "The Red Army has created its unprecedentedly strong discipline not with a club but on the basis of awareness, devotion and selflessness on the part of the workers and peasants themselves" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 38, p 240).

V. I. Lenin always demanded strict personal accountability on the part of each individual for the performance of his assigned service duties. The importance of this requirement of Lenin's is fully reflected in his words to the effect that "irresponsibleness... is the most dangerous evil..., which in the military frequently leads to certain catastrophe, chaos, panic, duplication of authority and defeat" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 39, p 46).

The importance of military discipline has increased significantly in the situation of today. This has been brought about by the complexity and extraordinary tension characteristic of modern warfare and by the qualitative changes occurring in military affairs. Today, as never before, it is essential for every fighting man to carry out orders and regulations irreproachably and strictly to observe all of the demands made by Soviet military discipline. To be disciplined is at the same time a regulation requirement and the moral duty of every Soviet fighting man. The undeviating fulfillment of requirements contained in the military manuals and instructions and the orders of commanders and chiefs creates the most important condition for insuring the homeland's security and for the personnel to remain in a constant state of readiness to halt the aggressive designs of the socialist state's enemies immediately.

As the propagandist comes to the end of the third topic, he should explain to the personnel in a clear and intelligible manner the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces in light of the demands formulated at the 25th CPSU Congress. It is important to give specific examples of fulfillment of the combat and political training plan and of socialist commitments by fighting men of the unit, ship or subunit. He should also explain in detail the practical tasks facing the personnel with respect to further improving the level of combat and political training, strengthening military discipline and reinforcing vigilance and combat readiness.

The topic should be concluded by underscoring the fact that Lenin's doctrine on defending socialism's conquests forms the scientific foundation for the Communist Party's military policy. Our party relies upon this doctrine for developing its military policy, a policy designed to further strengthen the Soviet State's defense capability, insure all-round leadership of its military organization and provide the Armed Forces with everything necessary and prepare them reliably to defend socialism's conquests against any aggressor. The security of our homeland and that of the other fraternal nations in the socialist commonwealth requires that every fighting man observe as something sacred V. I. Lenin's behests and the requirements set by the CPSU, be highly aware of their duty with respect to the service, strengthen military discipline in every way possible and improve the vigilance and the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships.

The instructor should recommend that the students read on their own in the evening V. I. Lenin's work "Obrashcheniye k Krasnoy armii" [Appeal to the Red Army] ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 38, pp 234-235); the Constitution of the USSR (Chapter 5); and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "The CPSU Central Committee's Report and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Area of Foreign and Domestic Policy" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," pp 8-11, 75-76, 83); the first chapter of the textbook for political classes "V. I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin On Defending the Socialist Homeland] (Voyenizdat, 1977).

During preparations for the classes, in the hours of mass political work, it is beneficial to set up Leninist readings and to show the films "Lenin In October" and "Lenin In 1918"; the documentary film chronicles "Always Be On Guard," "Our First Commandment" and "The Oath to the Homeland"; and the epic film series "The Great Patriotic War."

It is recommended that the following questions be discussed in the seminar (or discussion): 1. What are the basic principles underlying V. I. Lenin's doctrine on defending the socialist homeland? 2. How does the CPSU exercise leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces? 3. What does the Constitution of the USSR have to say about defending the socialist homeland? 4. Why is it essential strictly to observe V. I. Lenin's behests and the CPSU's requirements for thoroughly building up the Soviet Armed Forces and for improving their vigilance and combat readiness?

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SOVIET VIEWS ON PENTAGON'S CONFRONTATION PREPARATIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 79 signed to press 5 Nov 79 pp 84-89

[Article by Col V. Shubin: "The Pentagon on the Paths of Confrontation"]

[Text] During the recent celebration of the German Democratic Republic's 30th anniversary, a broad cross section of the world community had the opportunity again and again to see that a path to peace and to the enlodgment of detente is being systematically and persistently cleared by nations of the socialist commonwealth. In his speech at festivities in Berlin on 6 October, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, advanced a broad program of measures designed to supplement political detente in the military field and to strengthen peace in Europe and throughout the world.

It is perfectly apparent that putting into effect the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Act (SALT-II) and the implementation of new peace initiatives by the socialist nations aimed at restraining the continuing arms race have contributed to further normalization of the international climate and helped reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, international relations are now "at a sort of crossroads leading either to increased trust and cooperation or to increased mutual fear, suspicions and a build-up of arms--a crossroads ultimately leading either to a lasting peace or, at best, to brinkmanship."

Recent events have vividly demonstrated the fact that in the West, primarily the United States of America, there are influential imperialist groups obstinately attempting to halt the process of detente, whip up the arms race and return the world to the "cold war" era, an unhappy memory.

The structure of detente is under fierce fire from militarists, the bosses of the military-industrial monopolies, reactionary politicians

and their hired or volunteer underlings, who have joined forces in an extensive campaign against detente and disarmament, against peace and the security of nations.

The Pentagon heads the militaristic forces of international imperialism. Disregarding the peoples' desire for peace, and this includes the people of the United States, many generals and admirals in important positions in the American Defense Department have set out on a dangerous course of confrontation, on the "warpath" in the self-seeking, hegemonistic interest of the capitalist monopolies and the military-industrial complex of the United States.

Just before the new year of 1979 began, readers of the WASHINGTON POST were considerably surprised by some strange statements made by U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown. In an interview for that newspaper, he asserted that "there is an increasing danger that the United States and the Soviet Union may find themselves drawn into a third world war in which access to natural resources will be at stake." The Secretary added significantly that the "troubled situation in oil-rich Iran" might be an example of a "conflict of interest" between the United States and the USSR. This statement was taken not only as a clear threat and an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union but also as an open appeal to run the risk of war for the sake of the imperialist goals of the United States. The whole world knows, after all, that the Soviet Union lays no claim to a single ounce of foreign oil or any other natural resources nor to a single inch of foreign territory. If it does "find itself drawn into" a third world war, this can only be against its will and the fault of aggressive, adventuristic imperialist groups.

Provocative militaristic verbiage has become "good form" and a demonstration of "loyalty" in the Pentagon. James Schlesinger, Brown's predecessor, for example, stated in Congress: "The United States has foreign investments totaling more than 190 million dollars. We have important and growing interests in various nations--their markets and goods. Our political interests are even broader.... In order to keep our friends and protect our interests throughout the world, the United States has no alternative but to maintain a powerful military organization as the basis for exercising its world leadership."

American imperialism's aggressive, hegemonistic plans are being materialized in the continuous build-up of U.S. military power, primarily nuclear missiles. According to information published in the WASHINGTON POST, the United States has spent a total of 2 trillion dollars to develop and expand its military power since the end of World War II. In 1978, the U.S. arsenal of nuclear missiles included 1,054 land-based intercontinental missiles, 656 missiles deployed on submarines and 380 long-range bombers. The newspaper points out that theoretically, these means make it possible to deliver 6,500 megatons of nuclear explosives to more than 11,000 targets.

In today's situation, when no military threat exists either to U.S. security or to the basic interests of the American people, the existence of such a quantity of means of mass destruction is rightly termed by the progressive community as an act of madness, as a bout of the death throes in which imperialism, a misanthropic and inhumane social and economic system, finds itself.

The danger to peace is intensified by the fact that U.S. militaristic groups are seeking more and more allocations for military purposes. The magazine BUSINESS WEEK, a mouthpiece for the monopolies, recently wrote (more in the form of praise than as condemnation) that the Pentagon's constant stressing of the "Russian threat" is the "main reason" why the government and Congress are approving an increase in the Defense Department budget.

Washington plans to increase military expenditures by more than 10 billion dollars in 1980--to a record 141 billion dollars. For purposes of comparison, we recall that during the period of U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia, the Pentagon's military allocations had reached 75 billion dollars by the end of the active phase of the war in 1973. In the new budget, around 14 billion dollars is designated for developing strategic forces and creating new types of nuclear weapons. The generals at the Pentagon are rushing to renew the arsenal of ground-based intercontinental missiles. This includes adoption by the military of the MX blockbuster (s kassetnoy boyegolovkoy) missile, among others. It is planned to produce a total of at least 300. It is estimated that this program alone will cost the American taxpayers 40 billion dollars in the long run. The Pentagon is also accelerating the creation of a winged missile fleet to be installed on 120 B-52 bombers. The Navy will receive 13 nuclear-powered Trident submarines. A total of 50 billion dollars is being allocated for "general-purpose forces."

This is why any sort of limitation on nuclear missiles is not to the liking of the bosses of the U.S. military-industrial complex. It is not surprising that retired American generals, as a rule employed in the military-industrial companies, have long been engaged in a furious attack against the new SALT-II accord. As early as January of this year, more than 170 former admirals and generals sent an open letter to President Jimmy Carter, in which they used the false pretext of a "Soviet threat" to insist upon breaking off the agreement with the Soviet Union. Retired Admiral Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced a campaign to collect funds "to defeat the SALT-II accord in Congress."

At the present time, when the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are under discussion in various subcommittees and committees and the chambers of the U.S. Congress, the enemies of military detente are mobilizing more and more new proponents of the "business of killing." And again, they are being found primarily in the Pentagon. Lieutenant

General Rowny recently retired. Literally on the first day of his civilian life, he assailed SALT-II with criticism. The bourgeois press made much of the newly-appeared "hawk" and the WASHINGTON POST announced significantly that Rowny's testimony in Congress "would shatter White House fantasies about broad support for the agreement among the military."

Within the group of strategic military measures, the Pentagon is also giving special attention to improving the combat capability, on a qualitatively new basis, of the so-called "general-purpose forces." Here, we see such trends as the development of weapons and equipment, taking into account the "tasks of the post-Vietnam period," the development of strategic concepts and operational-tactical views on the employment of various branches of armed forces and troops arms in a war with the "main enemy," insuring proper mobilization and combat readiness of the armed forces within the United States, and stepped-up moral-psychological conditioning of the personnel.

New accents in statements by officials and in propaganda publications of the Pentagon are extremely symptomatic of this. The article "Vietnam and A New Approach in Strategy" published in the magazine ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, for example, states that between 1965 and 1976 the United States spent billions of dollars on the war in Vietnam and found as a result that "it is not in a position to conduct a war in Europe." And only now "has the United States begun producing the weapons necessary to restore the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact." The magazine ARMY theorizes that between 1945 and 1974 there was considerable skepticism with respect to the rightful role of conventional military forces in the nuclear age and that after World War II "the army lost its sense of strategic purpose." Because of the "European orientation," however, the U.S. Army, according to General Rogers, former chief of staff, "has found its right bearing."

The facts, of course, completely refute assertions about some sort of "aimless wandering" on the part of the American Army during the postwar period. The U.S. armed forces have conducted a number of large-scale aggressive actions for the benefit of the American monopolies. One cannot fail to see in such statements, however, Pentagon stress on improving the readiness of the conventional armed forces as part of the plan for implementing the strategic "overkill (poltory voyny)" concept.

In addition to the build-up of military power, world peace and the security of nations are also greatly threatened by the activities of U.S. militaristic groups in the international area. Following its defeat in the colonial war against the peoples of Indochina, the opinion was voiced in the United States that the U.S. armed forces should no longer perform the role of a world police force. The bitterness of defeat apparently faded very rapidly, however, and the Pentagon is once more beginning to brandish the policeman's club. As early as the fall of 1977, the WASHINGTON STAR reported that President Carter had signed a secret directive permitting

the Pentagon to begin training ground forces and Navy and Air Force subunits for possible military action "to protect the oil fields" in the Persian Gulf area.

The U.S. Defense Department has admitted that it is working intensively to develop a mobile 110,000-man rapid deployment force with "great striking power" to act in conflicts "beyond NATO borders." It is clear from articles published in the magazine SOLDIERS that formations and units of the 18th Air Corps based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, will provide the foundation for this force. "This is one of the largest tactical commands," the magazine states, "and it is equipped and trained for moving to any area of the world by land, air or sea, ready to go into combat immediately." The corps includes, among others, the 82d Airborne Division, the 5th and 7th special warfare groups, the 4th Psychological Warfare Group, the 96th Civilian Operations Battalion and other subunits. Lieutenant General Volney F. Warner, corps commander and veteran of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, says that corps personnel are carefully selected, that they are "highly professional" and that the units and formations are in a "high constant readiness state" and that "within 18 hours they can depart for any spot where, in the President's opinion, U.S. vital interests are threatened."

During the popular, anti-imperialist revolution in Iran, the Pentagon attempted to use force to influence events in the nation in the interests of reactionary forces. The powerful surge of rage generated in the Iranian people, however, and resolute moves on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations against foreign intervention in Iran's internal affairs, thwarted U.S. plans for military intervention. The cloistered establishments of the world-policing proponents will not leave the American military in peace, however. Recently, the Pentagon has endeavored to create new military and naval bases on the Arabian Peninsula and along the Persian Gulf and to increase the number of warships in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The decision by U.S. militaristic groups to step up their military presence around the Caribbean also poses a serious threat to peace.

And so, the Pentagon now serves as a dangerous source of tension in the world and an active proponent of the policy of American imperialism's aggressive forces.

Throughout the postwar period, preparations for a war against the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist commonwealth have formed the main constituent of U.S. military doctrine and the main focus of its strategic military measures. The book "Dropshot," published in the United States in 1978, reports that as early as 1945-46, Pentagon generals were proposing plans for delivering nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, and a detailed plot for a "world war against the Soviet Union in 1957," code-named "Dropshot," was worked out in 1949.

Pentagon plans for unleashing a war are now assuming greater scope and are openly aggressive. In July 1978, the magazine MILITARY REVIEW stated that the "assured destruction" concept proclaimed by American strategists 3 years before, included "the destruction of a minimum of 200 Soviet cities, which would result in the destruction of 34 percent of the population and 62 percent of the industrial capacity of the USSR." Not so long ago, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE informed its readers that the U.S. Defense Department, "after an 18-month study" had approved a "new concept," according to which the nuclear strike strategy would focus directly upon military targets--missiles in silos, airfields, troop locations and so forth--in addition to cities and industrial centers. Even this was not the limit to the Pentagon's adventurism, however. The progressive American press reports that the Pentagon has ordered a study, now under way in California, "to work out a strategy for using nuclear weapons, which would make it possible to eliminate the USSR as a functioning national entity." Another consulting firm of the U.S. Defense Department, located in the state of Virginia, is studying "the possibility of employing nuclear weapons for purposes of segmenting the Soviet Union"; a third organization is studying the possibility of "destroying Soviet leadership with strategic weapons for purposes of paralyzing, undermining and segmenting the Soviet Government," and so forth.

It is a known fact that the Pentagon attempts to mislead American public opinion with fabrications to the effect that its strategic undertakings are, ostensibly, in the nature of a forced response. Progressive U.S. press agencies, however, recently published a statement by engineer Robert Oldridge, who worked for aerospace companies for 16 years, designing submarine-launched, blockbuster missiles. He states that the missiles being created by the Pentagon "are designed for a surprise attack by the United States" and provides a detailed description of the process of working out the "preemptive strike program." This statement is yet another confirmation of the fact that the designs of the military clique on the other side of the ocean are extremely dangerous and aggressive.

The U.S. armed forces have set out on a course of raising the operational-tactical training of the personnel for an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, primarily in NATO's European theater of military operations.

A new ground forces field manual, FM-100-5, came out in the United States in 1976. Judging from comments in the foreign press, this manual has no precedent in the imperialist army's history. More than anything else, it represents a methodological plan for conducting combat operations against the Soviet Army in Europe. The American military press states that the FM-100-5 is "an important landmark in the transition from postwar thinking to the thinking of the 1980's and beyond," that it "has successfully reoriented the army in the direction of a planned battle in Europe" and has formulated the concept "of winning the initial battle" as the overall, focused scheme for conducting a land war.

The military-theoretical magazine MILITARY REVIEW writes that the United States, which ostensibly has a smaller armed force, should avoid a "war of depletion" and American forces should attempt to win by using such offensive actions as flank attacks, outflanking of the main force from unexpected directions, counterthrusts and withdrawals. A "classic example" of such tactics, according to the magazine, were "Rommel's actions in Africa in 1942." Another issue of the MILITARY REVIEW insists that it would be most effective in fighting the Soviet Army "to operate in small mobile subunits, to appear unexpectedly, day and night, to attack on the flanks and in the rear and disappear again." The magazine goes on to state: "Dispersal, speed and night operations combined with our superior equipment will insure us 'boys' victory in a war with our enemy--the 'big one.'"

In accordance with the new "bearings" and emphasis in strategic military plans, the scope of the Pentagon's military preparations in Europe has grown: The number and the scale of exercises and maneuvers and of the equipment and weapons have grown, new weapons models are being developed, which, as the foreign press puts it, are being "forced-fed" to the European NATO partners of the United States. Reports of interest in this respect "on problems on which the U.S. Army is working in order to oppose the Soviet Army" have been published in the magazine ARMY, a semiofficial mouthpiece for the Pentagon.

Describing the state of American equipment, the magazine ARMY complains that the existing tank is obsolete, the M-113 armored personnel carrier is vulnerable and burns easily in combat and a new artillery system under development "is already inferior to Soviet equipment with respect to rate of fire and barrel life," that the U.S. Army "does not possess the portable antitank weapons needed to combat Soviet tanks," and so forth. All of this is claimed in order to justify to the public in the Western nations the intentions of the American military leaders to replace or perfect a large number of weapons systems, with possible combat action against the Soviet Army and other armies of the Warsaw Pact nations in mind. The magazine ARMY has also reported that the United States has committed itself to increase its armed forces in the European theater, to provide the equipment and weapons for another three division, to expand the handling capacity of the "air bridge" between the United States and Europe considerably by 1982 and to create in the years immediately ahead stocks of ammunition and spare parts adequate for 30 days of combat operations.

Large sums are being allocated for building up the American arsenal of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. By the mid-1980's it is planned to deploy nuclear missiles there, which are capable, as the British newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES writes, "of hitting targets deep in the interior of the Soviet Union."

Pointing out the danger inherent in plans for deploying new types of American missiles in Western Europe in his speech in Berlin, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed the fact that the implementation of these designs would alter the strategic situation on the continent substantially. Their objective is to destroy the existing balance of power in Europe and to give the NATO bloc military superiority.

"With respect to military superiority," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated, "that remains to be seen, as they say. Naturally, the socialist nations would not look with indifference upon the efforts of the NATO militarists. In this case, we would be forced to take the additional steps necessary to strengthen our security. We have no alternative."

Although the main turn in the preparation of the U.S. armed forces has been toward military operations in Europe, Pentagon strategists have not given up on their plans for the global encirclement of the USSR and for the conduct of war in other theaters. The MILITARY REVIEW, for example, states that in general "we cannot rely upon Europe as a base for American forces," what is now becoming more strategically important is... Kamchatka. "Depriving the Soviet Union of Petropavlosk-na-Kamchatke," the magazine states, "as well as controlling the air and naval lines of communication in that area would have a decisive effect upon the USSR's position as a Pacific Ocean and world power." It goes on to say: "The American armed forces required to wrest Kamchatka from Soviet control basically already exists." All the "i's" have been dotted, so to speak.

The Pentagon's words and deeds leave no room for doubt as to whom the strategic military plans and preparations of the American militarists are directed against. It is also clear why the United States has stuck to its hair-splitting tactics in the Vienna talks on reducing the armed forces and weaponry in Central Europe and is in no hurry to respond to the specific and constructive initiatives and proposals advanced in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the ceremonies in Berlin.

While increasing the scale of their military preparations, American imperialism's strategists are also devoting an enormous amount of attention to the focused ideological conditioning of the nation's population and its armed forces personnel. It is no secret, after all, that millions of working Americans are beginning to think more and more seriously about the changes occurring in the world and can see the indisputable and continuously increasing successes achieved by the Soviet Union and its consistent and purposive course toward strengthening peace and developing mutually beneficial cooperation. The aggressive designs and dangerous preparations of U.S. militaristic groups are in antagonistic conflict with the basic interests of the vast majority of the American people.

A vast administrative and executive system functions in the United States for the ideological conditioning of the population and personnel in the armed forces, for which many millions of dollars are allocated. An

information service is in charge of the ideological and the moral-psychological conditioning of servicemen in the Defense Department. The Air Force, Navy and Army staffs have similar services. Field force and formation staffs have public affairs sections and brigades, separate battalions, ships, air wings and air and naval bases have community affairs officers with NCO assistants. The subunit commander is in charge of ideological conditioning in the company, battery or squadron itself. Military clergymen (chaplains) and special services officers are active in this area. More than 50 militaristic organizations under Pentagon supervision are engaged in the ideological conditioning of the population: the American Legion, the Armed Forces Association, the Reserve Officers Association and many others.

Movies, radio, military and civilian periodicals, and libraries are used for the militaristic conditioning of the population and personnel of the armed forces. The Pentagon attaches exceptionally great importance to television, primarily for exerting a centralized ideological influence upon American forces in Western Europe. Three television receiving and transmitting centers now exist in the FRG, which reach 90 percent of the military personnel with television broadcasts by means of more than 100 relay facilities. Special television centers have also been created in Italy, Greece and Spain and around the Mediterranean Sea. Programs from the United States are received by means of satellites.

The basic content of the ideological and psychological conditioning of personnel in the U.S. armed forces coincides with the main trends in the Pentagon's strategic military undertakings. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism therefore still form the core of this work. All sorts of concoctions about communism's threat to "American freedom and democracy," the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union and so forth are binned upon the minds of American soldiers every day. An analysis of this flow of propagandistic lies, slander and insinuations has made it possible to isolate a number of new elements in the Pentagon's ideological work. First of all, there is a perceptible attempt to neutralize by every means possible the positive influence produced upon U.S. servicemen by the policy of detente and controlling the arms race persistently pursued by the Soviet Union, by the entire socialist commonwealth and by all peace-loving states. The not-unreknowned General Alexander Haig, for example, who is one of the most militant representatives of the American militaristic groups and who served until recently as Supreme NATO Commander in Europe, has never stopped reiterating the statement that "detente must not be, there has never been detente but only a substitute brandishing of weapons and talk about cooperation," that "in the existing situation any reduction whatsoever of the American presence in Europe would be disastrous." The magazine MILITARY REVIEW asserts in unison with the general that "detente has lulled the United States and created a false impression of security." Other highly-placed American military figures, hypocritically dramatizing an alleged U.S. lag behind the USSR in the military, maintain that the

United States "is skating on thin ice, which is becoming thinner and thinner." The magazine AIR FORCE tells its readers with feigned alarm that the SALT-II agreement "will increase the risk of nuclear war and legitimize Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons."

Recently, the entire system of moral-psychological preparation of U.S. armed forces personnel for a war against the USSR has become more clearly defined. All forms of combat training and ideological conditioning of American servicemen are designed "to eliminate" their fear of the Soviet Army, which was implanted in them by means of propaganda over a long period of time, and to develop a state of "psychological readiness" to fight the Soviet soldier "face-to-face." A flight training program, code-named "Aggressor," has been instituted in the U.S. Air Force. It includes "making the pilot training as nearly as possible like an actual combat situation... by employing Soviet tactics." Special "Aggressor" squadrons of aircraft painted to look like Soviet aircraft have been created for this purpose. A special training center with a "Red Flag" pilot training program operates at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. A similar center is also being created for ground troops, at which 42 battalions--around 80,000 men--will go through a 2-week training program each year.

There has been a drastic increase in the number of articles on defeating Soviet tanks, shooting down Soviet aircraft, and so forth, in the American military press. The magazine ARMY writes about the need "to dispel the myth of the 9-foot Soviet soldier" and states that "in order to defeat the Soviet Army, the American Army must take advantage of its "weak spots."

The American press states that a new focus of ideological and psychological conditioning of U.S. armed forces personnel is "the healing of the moral-political wounds" suffered from the defeat in Indochina and eliminating the "Vietnam syndrome." As early as 1971, former U.S. President Nixon was forced to declare that "in Vietnam we are fighting a war in which there are no heroes." This "deheroization" of the American soldier conflicted with the Pentagon's position, which was concerned with building up the morale of the U.S. armed forces for new aggressive ventures. A broad propaganda campaign is now under way, designed to create an aura of imaginary glory and grandeur around veterans of the war in Vietnam. "Let us put Vietnam where it belongs--in the chronicle of great events in which the army performed its mission brilliantly," demands the magazine ARMY. Former U.S. Defense Minister James Schlesinger wrote in a special appeal to the troops in 1975: "The duty you have performed in the difficult situation remains unsurpassed. There is no question that you have earned the nation's respect, admiration and gratitude." In a speech to Pentagon staff members in March 1977, President Jimmy Carter stated, with Vietnam in mind, that "military personnel are not responsible for

errors committed in unpopular wars of the past." This sort of "reevaluation" and a kind of "absolution of sins" are intended not so much for the past as for the future.

The policy of intensifying military confrontation being pursued by the Pentagon and militaristic forces of international imperialism can have serious consequences for world peace and the security of nations. It is precisely for this reason that peace-loving forces over the planet are speaking out resolutely against the dangerous preparations of the American military clique and its NATO allies.

The acts of provocation performed by the aggressive forces of imperialism make it necessary for our homeland's armed defenders to exercise great vigilance and remain in a state of constant combat readiness. The Armed Forces of the USSR are vigilantly guarding the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and of the peoples of the entire mighty socialist commonwealth, and are always prepared to provide a crushing rebuff for any aggressor.

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DIRIGIBLES: EMPLOYMENT IN U.S. DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Yu. Boyko, engineer, under the rubric "Technical Military Thought Abroad": "The Return to the Dirigible"]

[Text] The first third of the present century has often been called abroad the "golden age" of the dirigible. Aerial giants of every possible design and the most varied functions plowed the sky of the planet. At that time, many even among specialists tied the prospects for assimilating the fifth ocean to the lighter-than-air aircraft. Dirigibles and aerostats were built abroad for military purposes too. In the 30's, for example, the American navy had dirigible-aircraft carriers in its inventory. They were capable of carrying 5-7 fighters which were launched and docked during the flight of the airborne aircraft carrier.

The swift and widespread development of aviation cut short the "golden age" of the dirigible and, it seemed, closed the road into the future for it forever. After the Second World War airship building had ceased practically everywhere, and the aerial mastadons remaining here and there ended up as museum curiosities.

But now, judging by press reports, foreign specialists including military are showing an ever increasing interest in it. The fact is that lighter-than-air aircraft possess attractive advantages over aircraft and helicopters. First of all they have a far greater load capacity, are more economical, and can easily "hover" in the air. In addition, dirigibles and aerostats do not need expensive air fields. How then do the foreign military specialists expect to take advantage of these definite advantages of lighter-than-air aircraft?

It should be emphasized right off, however, that of course one does not have to talk about the return of the dirigible in its original form. It is a question of searching for ways to make the most efficient use of the principle of airship navigation in combination with modern achievements of scientific and technical progress. Based on this, the so called hybrid aircraft--dirigibles with wings or a combination of an envelope with helicopter type rotors--are considered the most promising abroad.

These are just the sort of craft, American specialists believe, that may be employed in organizing anti-submarine defense, shore patrol, for detecting submarines, escorting convoys, as carriers for cruise missiles and radar systems, an airborne post for command communication, and for delivering various types of cargo.

Foreign specialists believe that the aircraft and helicopters commonly used today for search and detection of submarines have substantial shortcomings: high level of noise and vibration which reduce the operational efficiency of the equipment on board, as well as insufficient autonomy. In addition, it is difficult to use aircraft at altitudes of 90-120 m which is necessary for successful operation of gas analyzing equipment.

An American firm, having caught the potential interest of a military client, has worked out the concept of an anti-submarine dirigible. Leaning on such dirigible advantages as the possibility of flights of many days duration (in 1957, this firm's dirigible remained in the air for 264 hours without refueling), as well as its capability of hovering over the surface of the sea, the authors of this project have proposed placing on board the dirigible not only equipment for search and detection but also weapons to destroy submarines. It has been noted that the capabilities of the dirigible can be significantly enhanced by placing piloted or remote controlled aircraft on it.

The anti-submarine dirigible is a structured envelope filled with helium. It provides aerostatic lift, and this hybrid system is powered by four modernized CH-54B helicopters (see photo) [not reproduced]. The envelope capacity is 370,000 m^3. It has been indicated that the dirigible will be able to remain at a designated point for up to 500 hours with a head wind of 50 km/h and operate within a radius of 4,600 km.

It is believed that using four helicopters as the power plant reduces to a minimum the problems associated with dirigible ballasting during loading or unloading and provides good controlability. By the way, it was reported that the automatic system for control of all four helicopters by one pilot has already been checked out in a CH-47 helicopter during 300 flying hours. Experts believe that no special ground equipment will have to be built for operation of such a dirigible.

American specialists are also studying the possibilities of using rigid dirigibles for transportation of equipment and supplies for the army. The dirigible has been compared to the C5-A heavy transport and sea transports designed to perform the same missions. It was noted that the dirigible is especially efficient in transporting low density or very bulky loads.

American specialists also expect to use hybrid vehicles of the "Aircrane" type which is a combination of an aerostat and helicopter, for transporting cargo from ship to shore and from shore to ship. In this case, 40 percent of the total lift is aerostatic lift, and the remaining 60 percent is created by the rotating blades of rotors.

According to a statement by a representative of the U.S. Navy Sea Transportation Command, the "Aircrane" will make it possible to transport loads from ships to shore and further into a country at a speed far exceeding that of existing means. In his opinion, the average speed of flow of the cargo when using "Aircrane" type vehicles will reach 80 km/h, while present vehicles average 10-15 km/h. In addition, it is stressed that such vehicles can be used to transport heavy vehicles and equipment damaged in combat to repair stations.

It would seem that the large dimensions of the lighter-than-air aircraft would make them defenseless against modern means of destruction. However foreign specialists believe that this is not the case at all. They believe that a large rigid dirigible could sustain a hit by several guided "air-air" missiles without serious consequences. At the same time, one missile striking a C5-A, for example, would be a catastrophe for it. In addition, a repair brigade can eliminate the damage to the dirigible directly in flight, and the sectioning of its gas capacity preserves boyancy in event of leaks of part of the supporting gas through holes in the envelope. In short, the experts maintain that the necessary level of invulnerability of a dirigible can be fully provided, if it is charged with execution of the missions available to it.

The need for prolonged observation from the air of ground or surface objects is compelling military specialists abroad to look for means which would have great autonomy, the capability of flight for a duration of many days, and low cost. American specialists, for example, have particular hopes for high-altitude controllable aerostats. Tests of several such vehicles were conducted in the United States. The capacity of one of them was 3,000 m^3. An electric engine, powered by silver-zinc batteries, turned a propeller with a diameter of 4.3 m, which created 51 kg of thrust. The total flying weight of the aerostat was 252 kg, with the weight of the structure accounting for 48 kg of that. The aerostat completed a radio controlled flight with maneuvering at an altitude of 21.5 km.

According to the foreign press a high-alt[illegible] aerostat with a capacity of 28,300 m^3 is now under development. [illegible]pe was manufactured from ultra-strong light fabric made of aramid[illegible]ibers which is immune to ultraviolet radiation and is gastight. American specialists believe that the high-altitude aerostat will be able to conduct continual observation of the earth's surface over an area up to 1 million km^2.

In short, a transition is being made abroad from studying the possibilities of military employment of dirigibles and other lighter-than-air aircraft to building test models. The future will show what characteristics they will have. Modern achievements in science and technology make it possible to introduce new methods and principles into the half-forgotten art of airship building and open new prospects.

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SPECIAL TROOPS: PONTOON BATTALION TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Polyakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner North Caucasus Military District: "Bridge Built"]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant N. Shekhter bent over the map in thought, sliding the light from the flashlight over it. He ordered the platoon leaders to come to the head of the company column and while they gathered there, he considered what was the best and fastest way of accomplishing the assigned mission.

Several hours ago, the pontoon batallion under the command of Major N. Zaytsev had left the military camp at the assembly signal. Everyone thought that they would be operating at batallion strength, but while on the march Sr. Lieutenant Shekhter had suddenly received the order to change the direction of movement, proceed to a water barrier and erect a crossing with the forces of a company.

When the officers gathered at the lead vehicle, the solution was ready. The company commander briefly assigned the mission. He called the attention of the platoon leaders to the necessity of providing camouflage and march discipline. The company was already used to operating at night. Nevertheless, Senior Lieutenant Shekhter considered it necessary to once again remind his subordinates about security measures while erecting the bridge and that each warrior had to be constantly ready for combat.

The mission had been complicated by the fact that the company had to perform its own engineering reconnaisance in the area of the crossing, since the subunit designated for this remained at the disposition of the battalion commander. This task was given to the platoon led by Senior Lieutenant A. Bezbidovich. Would he be able to cope with this task?

The scouts are moving out ahead. They have to determine the speed, depth and width of the river, the nature of the bottom, select an area for concentration of the company, and the place to unload the cutters....

Senior Lieutenant Bezbidovich and his subordinates have many concerns. While dispatching the scouts, the company commander reminded them about yet another detail of no small importance--about the markers. The route of movement to the crossing point had to be indicated with the special markers. Senior Lieutenant Shekhter had had problems with them before. A year ago, when he was still a platoon leader, he had also received a mission to reconnoiter a crossing area, but in the rush he forgot about the markers. The company column then strayed from the route quite a number of times as it advanced to the designated area....

Senior Lieutenant Bezbidovich did everything properly. Following the route marked by the scouts, the company arrived at the water barrier at precisely the designated time. All the required data for the equipping of the crossing was available. The pontoon company began performing the basic task. Powerful vehicles loaded with pontoons approached the shore, turned around and backed to the water.

The company commander kept a watchful eye on the actions of his subordinates. During the nighttime training exercises, some inexperienced drivers were not able to properly drive their vehicles to the river right away. Some stopped too far away from the water line and the pontoons were laid on the ground. Time was lost because they then had to be dragged to the river. Others drove back too far, the vehicles got stuck, and a tractor was required to pull them out... but now everyone was operating quite well.

The links were quickly fastened into a reliable firm strip. The work of the warriors was crucial and required great skill. After all everything was being done in the water, and one wrong move could result in a pontoon being caught up by the strong current. The commander had foreseen the difficulties his subordinates would face while performing the mission. He ordered the officers to arrange their people so that new soldiers had experienced specialists next to them. Even the company first sergeant, Warrant Officer V. Nichepay, put aside his usual concerns for a while and helped the pontoon company put the links of the bridge together. The standard time allotted for this operation had not yet expired when the finished bridge was already rocking on the waves at the shore. The cutter team headed by Warrant Officer A. Podlesnyy quickly took it across the river.

Before going out on the exercise, Senior Lieutenant Shekhter's subordinates had made high socialist pledges. And they kept their word. Competing in laying the bridge with the personnel from the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Chernetsov, they emerged the victors and accomplished the task much faster than the standard time. The warriors in both subunits have shown that the missions assigned to them in the summer period of training are being executed successfully.

TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS: DISSEMINATION PROBLEMS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Khmel'kov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, under the rubric "From the Practice of Competition": "How to Inculcate Experience?"]

[Text] This question would hardly need be raised if it concerned, for example, only the introduction into practice of some successful technical innovation. In this case everything would be clear. Familiarize the specialists with its design and technology of manufacture, and they would quickly make as many copies as needed. That is exactly how the special cart for transporting and hanging missiles, which was first made by Technical Service Senior Lieutenant I. Neupokoyev in the unit, became widely distributed in the squadrons of our air regiment. Using it made it possible to reduce the time to prepare missile-carrying aircraft for sorties for combat employment by 15 percent.

But how does one introduce the advanced know-how of organization of socialist competition? After all, this is an entire complex of measures for guidance of it. These measures reflect the style of work of the commander and his ability to stir up competition among the warriors and to be guided by the party organization.

I recall that we had a poster showing the leading flight commander, Captain N. Repin, hanging in a prominent place. Under his photograph was the story about how he created an atmosphere of competitiveness in the flight. When they hung up this poster, the party activists thought that the introduction of this advanced know-how was now assured by itself. But some time passed and it did not look as if the experience of Captain Repin would spread.

What is the matter? They say that one should not rely only on everything new and advanced forcing itself into practice. Active purposeful propaganda is required. But what specifically is meant by the word "active?"

Party activists recently generalized the experience of yet another flight commander--Captain M. Shemet. The text was manifolded on a typewriter and distributed in the form of pamphlets in the squadrons, so that the other commanders could at any time refer to the "secrets" of the successes of their colleague, the experience of which contained much that is instructive in the organization of competition on problems and combat standards and in the technique of determining the victor in a flight. But is this work sufficient to ensure active inculcation of experience? Perhaps not. It seems to me that the distribution of pamphlets is a passive method.

It is evident that posters and pamphlets do not exhaust the possibilities for distribution of advanced know-how. And not everything in them manages to provide deep insights. Thus, that same pamphlet covering the experience of Shemet poorly reflects how he cooperates with the party group organizer, and specifically how his ability to apply the method of the individual approach to his subordinates is manifested.

What then are the best forms for distributing advanced know-how of organization of competition? The party activists in our regiment have not yet formed a firm view on this question. Perhaps a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reader will tell us how this matter was handled in his military collective.

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COMBAT TACTICS: TRANSBAYKAL M.D. COMMANDER DISCUSSES MANEUVER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Colonel General G. Salmanov, commander of the troops of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District, under the rubric "Field Training of Troops": "Maneuver--The Heart of Combat"]

[Text] The evolution of equipment and armament is having a serious impact on the nature of modern combat. It's tremendous spatial scope, the presence in the combat formations of the sides of intervals and open flanks, and the sharply expanded front of operations of the units and subunits are creating favorable opportunities for maneuver with the means of destruction, second echelons and reserves. The role of maneuver in modern combat is tremendous, especially for concentrating efforts where the enemy least expects an attack. At the same time, one cannot but note the factors which complicate execution of a maneuver. These include the high density of combat formations, the rapid development of events on the battlefield, and the capability of the enemy to take rapid and effective countermeasures. Under modern conditions, maneuver can be successful only when it is prepared and executed in the shortest possible time, purposefully and decisively. All this makes exceptionally high demands on the professional training and forging of the moral qualities and will power of the combined-arms commander--the organizer of combat.

The commander must assess the situation rapidly and skillfully, foresee its probable development, control the troops firmly, and be bold and take the initiative in decisions. The primary school where the officer acquires and improves these qualities is the tactical exercise.

On an exercise, if it is well prepared and conducted in a complex and dynamic situation, the commander has ample opportunity to maneuver forces and means, and to impose his will on the "enemy" as well as conditions of waging combat that are unfavorable for him. Here, for example, is how events unfolded on an exercise in which the unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Petrachenko participated.

In an advantageous position, the unit had repulsed an attack by the "enemy" advance subunits. However, with each minute the situation became more and more unfavorable. The "enemy" had considerable superiority in forces and means. Lieutenant Colonel Petrachenko decided to leave a covering force in the occupied positions, but withdraw the main forces in depth to a new direction and to prepare a flank attack. His superior commander approved this decision. The maneuver was conducted quickly and secretly. The subunits left at the previous positions misled the "enemy" by a bold maneuver. The "enemy" had not noticed the withdrawal of the main forces and attacked the old defensive positions and developed the offensive until he was subjected to a powerful attack on his open flank by the main forces of the unit. The skillful and concealed maneuver facilitated the accomplishment of the mission. The success of the unit in the difficult defensive battle was predetermined by continuous and effective reconnaissance which made it possible for the commander to figure out the "enemy" plan, conceal his intentions from him, and force him to do battle under disadvantageous conditions.

In making the decision to maneuver his forces, the unit commander naturally took into consideration the enhanced maneuvering capabilities of the subunits and their high mobility. With other equipment, such a swift relocation in difficult terrain would have been impossible. Tactics depend on the combat properties of the equipment and armament. At the same time, creative research in tactics is opening ways for fuller and more effective utilization of the capabilities of the new means of conflict.

For example, maneuver by fire which has always played a large role in achieving the aims of combat has acquired new features. During the Great Patriotic War, maneuver by artillery fire was, as a rule, preceded by movement into the area of new firing positions. Limited artillery range did not permit in-place maneuvering by fire along the front and in depth for broad coverage. Now, the significantly increased maximum effective range, maximum rate of fire and mobility of fire weapons have naturally brought an increase in the role of maneuver by fire. Skillful maneuvering by fire makes it possible for a commander to opportunely destroy newly exposed tactical means of nuclear attack and antitank guided rocket missile launchers, to suppress revived and newly exposed artillery, mortar and antiaircraft batteries, and to ensure commitment to combat of second echelons on the offense and counterattacks on defense. It is clear that these and many other missions are accomplished also by maneuver by fire of motorized infantry and tank subunits; the mobility, power and maximum effective range of their fire weapons have become immeasurably greater. However, all missions on the battlefield cannot be accomplished by shifting fire. The commander must be ready to also boldly maneuver the materiel portion, relocating it from secondary to more important sectors.

The clever concentration of forces and means in the direction of the main attack on the offense or in major directions on defense has always been considered an indicator of the high skill of a commander. The experience gained in this area has lasting value.

During the Great Patriotic War, our commanders proved themselves true masters of the maneuver. For example, the 4th Tank Brigade under the command of Colonel M. Katukov, which subsequently became the 1st Guards, made brilliant use of the maneuver in the severe battles at Moscow. At that time the enemy had overwhelming superiority in tanks. The enemy had to be stopped; he had to be delayed as long as possible at each line; the time that was so necessary for bringing up the reserves had to be won, while preserving materiel and combat capability. The brigade tankers accomplished this mission thanks to high skill and the clever combination of maneuver with ambush operations. From the 4th through the 10th of October, 1941, while suffering small tank losses, the brigade destroyed 133 tanks and 49 guns of the Hitlerites and became an invincible barrier for the enemy.

The following example is also interesting even from the point of view of modern capabilities of forces. In January, 1944, the 286th Infantry Division pressed the enemy back to the Lug River, where the Hitlerites had earlier prepared defensive positions. An attempt to breach the defense with a rush was unsuccessful. The division commander decided to continue attacking the enemy with part of the forces of two infantry regiments, and send the main forces to the enemy flanks. Misled by the continuing attacks on the front, the Hitlerites concentrated all their available forces here. The attack on their flanks and rear took them completely by surprise. The precision of the commander's plan and the bold and secret maneuver ensured the rout of the enemy in a short time and with minimal losses.

Of course, quite a few such examples can be cited. Maneuver of forces and means was used extensively in the war years. In the contemporary phase of the evolution of military affairs, with the predominance of operations that are highly mobile and being waged in independent directions, with the absence of a continuous front, maneuver has become to an even greater extent a mandatory condition for achieving success in combat.

The organizer of combat must equally skillfully make use of the various forms of maneuver. In addition to the flank maneuver--close and deep envelopment or a combination of them, modern combat requires skillful employment of frontal maneuver. It is most often implemented by the second echelon or reserves for exploitation of success or shifting of efforts, elimination of enemy assault forces, repelling his counter-attack on an open flank, etc. The selection of the form of maneuver

is determined in each specific case by the situation, the shape of the front line, terrain features, balance of forces and means, as well as by other factors which must be assessed in the aggregate and made use of to outwit the enemy and force one's tactics on him.

Modern combat is always a struggle between the minds and wills of commanders. A commander who is inclined to creative pursuits and not afraid of a risk based on profound knowledge and precise calculations makes fuller use of the capabilities of one's own and attached and supporting subunits. A sense of the new and the ability to make independent decisions are formed in officers during the daily training process and primarily in tactical, specialized tactical and command and staff exercises. Here one can always create a complex situation that simulates combat to the maximum through active operations of the opposing sides.

Unfortunately, for the present not every exercise meets the requirements of advanced methodology. At times even in two-sided exercises, the "enemy" is straightforward and obliging and is prepared to operate only in accordance with the director's plan. No less harm to the formation of commanders and their professional growth is inflicted by the excessive tutelage of junior commanders on the part of some senior commanders and the attempt to ensure a high mark for the subunit participating in the exercise at any price.

On a tactical exercise with combat fire, the commander of a motorized infantry battalion, Captain V. Kovalenko, for example, did not trouble himself at all with organization of reconnaissance. He received all data firsthand--from the verifying division of headquarters. The motorized infantry men easily reached the defense of the "enemy," repulsing his counterattack, and attacked the left flank with a rehearsed maneuver. Rehearsed because it was exactly the same as that used on the previous exercise.

The high grade by which the exercise director attempted to assess the level of training of the subunit did not reflect the truth. The simplifications also inflicted great moral damage, leading the younger officers to believe that maneuver on the battlefield is a simple matter which requires neither creativity nor exertion of intellect. On the surface the commander undergoing training did not operate straightforwardly and employed a maneuver. In reality though, he was a captive of the pattern, the scheme suggested and approved by his superior commander, suggested by the "prompter" in the person of the verifier.

The contribution of this type of exercise to training commanders will hardly be tangible. To lead an officer by the hand in the dynamics of combat means to interfere with his formation and to deprive him of the genuine school which all tactical exercises must be for every

officer. It should also be emphasized that without creative work prior to combat on clarifying the overall concept, the situation, and on analysis of information on the "enemy," without thorough organization of combat and making comprehensive provisions for it, and without the inner aspiration to employ maneuver, one need not count on success.

In training practice, there is no place for exercises, the concept of which does not provide for extensive display of initiative by the commanders. It is especially important to train officers for bold maneuvering by fire and movement under the conditions of wooded-marshy, mountainous-steppe, and desert regions. Combat training experience in the district units shows that frontal attacks are far from always lead to positive results. Open difficult terrain in combination with artificial obstacles makes it possible for an "enemy" even with small forces to cover the directions accessible for troops. In such situations, the mission cannot be accomplished without enveloping detachments. Their bold and decisive operations conducted with initiative, just as in the years of the past war, play an important role in capturing centers of resistance and advantageous positions, and in ensuring a swift attack from the front.

The capabilities of enveloping detachments have expanded considerably under modern conditions. Owing to the increased speed of the equipment and the increased fire power of the subunits, they can inflict surprise and powerful strikes from the most advantageous directions. On an exercise, the tank company under the command of Captain A. Minkin covered 20 kilometers cross-country in a short time and captured an advantageous position in the "enemy" rear, thereby providing for the deployment and commitment to combat of the main forces of the enveloping detachment.

The success of a maneuver depends on the ability of commanders of combined-arms units and subunits to opportunely and properly assess the situation and find the main link predetermining the outcome of combat. The knowledge of the requirements of our combat regulations, the organization, armament and tactics of operations of the probable enemy, and the physical and geographic conditions of the theater of military operations is acquiring ever greater significance.

Success of maneuver is provided for by the selection of the most expedient forms of waging combat and by a skillful combination of them. In carrying out a maneuver, it is important to constantly retain fire initiative which is achieved by varying the methods of conducting massed and grouped fire, by disrupting enemy countermaneuvers, and by reliable fire and engineering provisioning for adjacent or exposed flanks.

Many tactical exercises are now being conducted in the units in the concluding phase of the training year. The final check will also be replete with them. It is important to organize training combat such that it enriches commanders and all personnel with the skills of employing maneuver, and with the ability to make effective use of the first class combat equipment and weaponry. Each exercise must be a school for mastery and courage, and form high moral-combat qualities in the warriors.

8545
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COMBAT TRADITIONS: INCULCATING HEROIC ACTIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Readiness for a Feat"]

[Text] Major V. Pavlov, military pilot first class, who wound up in a complicated situation during a night flight, acts boldly, decisively and with exceptional competence, displays high self-control and lands his aircraft safely. Private A. Sobolev, risking his life, takes a burning vehicle out of the park. Seaman D. Dudorov during a landing of marine infantry saves a comrade whose parachute collapsed....

There is no counting the stirring examples of valor, courage, and bravery of the warriors of the army and navy, and their heroic, noble deeds on exercises, flights, sea cruises, and in everyday life and service, and during time of disaster. These facts mean a great deal. They show the noble aspiration of Soviet warriors to stand next to the heroes of battles and to follow the example of their glorious deeds. They are clear confirmation of the fact that our Armed Forces, as stressed in the CC CPSU decree "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Educational Work," are an outstanding school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship. These examples attest to the daily readiness for a feat of the present generation of armed defenders of the homeland.

An ardent yearning for bold and heroic deeds has always been characteristic of the warriors of the army and navy of the land of the Soviets, just as of all our youth. And this is understandable. We are the fighting men of an army born in the fire of revolutionary storms, one created and brought up by the great Lenin and the party of the communists, an army whose banner is covered with the unfading glory of victories. All our reality, the socialist social system, and the Soviet way of life strengthen and develop in man lofty designs and noble aspirations, and cultivate the readiness for heroic achievements in the name of the triumph of communism.

This readiness was displayed with special force at the time of the severe trials which the years of conflict with fascist German invaders were for our people. Defying danger, not sparing their life, displaying courage, bravery, mass heroism, Soviet warriors went into battle for the beloved homeland. The feats of the defenders of the Brest Fortress and Odessa, Leningrad and Sevastopol, Moscow and Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and Tula, and of the heroes of the hard fighting on all fronts of the Great Patriotic War are locked in our memory forever. They evoke admiration in all Soviet people and the aspiration to be worthy successors of the combat glory of the heroes.

The loyal sons of our heroic nation, heirs and continuers of its revolutionary and combat traditions the warriors of the current generation are piously performing their civic duty to defend the socialist homeland. Their striving to justify the high trust of the party and people and to dress on the feats of the heroes of battles is displayed first of all in the self-sacrificing military labor, in the ability to effectively accomplish combat training missions with high quality, in the precise execution of the orders and instructions of commanders and superiors, in the daily campaign for meeting socialist pledges, and for raising the combat readiness of the unit, ship, and formation. Just as at the front, so too in our day, the standards for mastery, courage and loyalty to duty are being set by communist and Komsomol members. The true heroes of our current training days are the outstanding performers in combat and political training, the rated specialists, and masters of the combat rating, the ranks of which are continually growing and multiplying.

As is known, people are not born heroes. People become heroes in labor, in military deeds, and in the struggle for great, noble, lofty goals. Readiness for a feat is cultivated by the entire system of educational and training work conducted in the units and on the ships. And in the process it is very important to remember that the sources of this readiness lie in ideological conviction, in loyalty to communist ideals, and in ardent Soviet patriotism. Courage, bravery, heroism and other noble traits of Soviet warriors are formed more successfully where the entire activity of the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations is directed in the first place to instilling in personnel high political consciousness, loyalty to the cause of the Communist Party, and the readiness to execute an order of the homeland at any moment.

A major role in forming such qualities belongs to the propaganda among the troops and fleets of the glorious traditions of heroism of the Soviet Armed Forces, the regiment, the ship, and the formation. The loyalty of the young warriors to these traditions is a vivifying feeling. It induces excellent command of the first-class equipment and the making of ever fresher advances in military mastery. Propaganda of the traditions of heroism must become an integral feature of all

political and educational work. Correspondence with veterans of battles should be activated, and readers' conferences, film festivals, topical evenings devoted to the heroic spirit, and museum excursions should be held more often. New possibilities for improving this work are being opened by the developing preparation for the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War.

The bravery, boldness, courage, decisiveness and persistence in overcoming difficulties and in achieving the set goal, high military mastery, and the physical and psychological seasoning which condition the capability for completing a heroic deed, are being cultivated by the entire tenor of our military life. Especially favorable for forming them are standing combat and guard duty, troop and fleet exercises, field firings, flights and sea cruises. The path to courage is embedded in the very principle of military training: to teach the troops that which is necessary in war. That is why each hour of training time must be used with maximum benefit not only to inculcate in subordinates ways of handling combat equipment and weaponry, but also to teach them to act with courage, decisiveness, initiative and boldness.

The training year is coming to a close. Soviet warriors are laboring with great spirit in this busy time, striving with honor to complete the plans of combat and political training, to meet their socialist pledges, and to make fresh advances in combat improvement. Hundreds and thousands of heroes of peacetime are being born in the self-sacrificing military labor, vividly confirming that dressing on a feat and the readiness for it has become a vital principle of the armed defenders of the socialist homeland.

8545
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EXTENDED SERVICE: SERVICEMEN'S QUESTIONS ANSWERED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sep 79 p 4

[Questions and Answers in the column "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Information Service": "Acceptance for Extended Service"]

[Text] [Question] Servicemen N. Kositsin, V. Fedorov and A. Levchenko asked us about the acceptance procedures for extended service.

[Answer] According to the current regulation, those eligible for active extended service are soldiers, seamen, sergeants and master sergeants, who have served an active term of military service, as well as those in the reserves, who are no older than 35 years, and who have at least an 8th grade education, good knowledge of a military specialty and who have a favorable record in combat and political training or in industry.

One may volunteer for extended service of a period of two, four or six years. At the end of this term, active extended service may be voluntarily extended each time for any of these terms.

Servicemen who have expressed the wish to enter extended service in the same unit where they are serving their active duty term submit a written commitment on the prescribed form prior to release to the reserves. Those who decide to enter extended service in other military units submit written commitments three months prior to release to the reserve indicating the military unit in which they wish to serve on extended service. When approvals for extended service are received from other military units, these servicemen, when their peers are transferred to the reserve, are transferred to the new place of duty on orders from the commander of the military unit. If the term of active service in the military unit (on the ship) at the new duty station is three years and the serviceman has served a two-year term of regular active duty in a military unit, he is enlisted for extended service without an extension of the term of regular active duty.

Selection of candidates for extended service from reserve soldiers, seamen, sergeants and master sergeants, is made by rayon (city) military commissariats according to requisitions by commanders of military units.

Soldiers, seamen, sergeants and master sergeants from the Internal Troops are accepted for extended service on a universal basis with servicemen in the Soviet Army and Navy. Servicemen on extended service may remain on active duty until age 50.

[Question] Senior Sergeant V. Zakharov and Sergeant E. Ponov asked: "May servicemen on extended duty enter military and civilian educational institutions for study?"

[Answer] Servicemen on extended duty, at the expiration of the first term of their commitment for which they were accepted for extended duty, are admitted to military educational institutions in accordance with the rules for admittance to military educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense. They may study at secondary evening schools, as well as at correspondence and evening civilian higher and secondary specialized educational institutions subjects related to their military specialty or those which will increase specialized knowledge of the type of work performed by them, and they will be granted privileges authorized for pupils and students of the respective educational institutions.

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MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT:COMMANDER'S TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Kulakov: "A Division Commander's Lessons"]

[Text] Nine years ago, the young officer Igor' Agarkov was KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's guest at a festive eveining program on the occasion of the Victory Day celebration. He was at that time in command of an outstanding company in the Guards Red Banner Order of Suvorov Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin.

At the meeting that night, Agarkov made the acquaintance of noted military leaders and distinguished working people and figures from the world of art and literature. With some joyous emotion he spoke with Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR Vladislav Volkhov, and he confessed to the poet Mikhail L'vov that he himself wrote verses. The poet smiled--who doesn't write verses at your age, he asked--and asked him to read something. After listening to the officer's work, he declared: "Don't throw your verses away. The heart of a military man, of a defender of the motherland, should be open and receptive to anything of excellence."

I then had occasion the other day to meet once again with Lieutenant Colonel Igor' Agarkov in one of our remote garrisons. He had come here following the completion of his work at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. A year ago he had been assigned the command of a motorized rifle regiment. It was no light burden that the 32-year-old officer was shouldering. Especially considering the fact that the situation he had inherited wasn't one of the easiest and that his predecessor had been removed from his post for deficiencies in personnel training and indoctrination and in his own personal conduct.

And no, the regiment has not become one of our top military units during the past year. Even now there remain unresolved problems here, and there have most certainly been slipups and miscalculations in the operational manner of the commander himself, for which he has had on occasion to listen to come valid criticism directed toward him. There has been improvement, though. The lieutenant colonel has grown in knowledge and experience, and this is a sure guarantee of future success. "He is still growing and developing, but I believe he'll make a good regimental commander," his division commander declared.

But I had already learned from Agarkov himself how wisely, how skillfully and tactfully the division commander was instructing him. The lieutenant colonel's story appeared to me to be instructive, and so I decided to retell it here as fully as possible [author's introductory comment].

They were putting me in for a regimental command assignment in another formation (soyedineniye). But an army general on the military council declared:

"We're assigning you to a regimental command in your own division."

At that point nothing could have made me any happier. I traveled to the garrison, not as though by any ordinary means of conveyance, but rather as if transported by wings themselves. I'm not saying that I was given to see my future duties in my new assignment in rosy colors alone. I was aware of how extremely difficult the discharge of my responsibilities there would be. But on the other hand, I reasoned, I have already served in the position of deputy regimental commander, they know me in the division and I know many people there....

But then after I had immersed myself in the thick of my new duties and become occupied with all their burdens and concerns, I realized how difficult it sometimes is to be able to make a decision on a solid, well-founded basis and to weigh all the pro's and con's involved in a particular matter. And it was precisely here in connection with these problems that I became most fully aware of the support provided me by the deputy commander for political affairs. Lieutenant Colonel Igor' Andreyevich Platonov. He was able to divine and understand my difficulties as if by come sixth sense. He would drop into the office, pull up a seat, make it a point to find out what I had on my mind and then begin to set forth his views on the angle from which to approach the solution of that particular problem. I would listen, compare his ideas, evaluations and analyses with my own, modify my conclusions and there would then begin to take shape the general outline, to mature in my thinking the basic elements of a solution.

The division commander frequently visited the regiment. When he would see the slipups and blunders I had been guilty of, he was not one to resort to reprimands, but rather would correct and instruct me. Vladimir Georgiyevich knows how to win your favor, you don't feel any tension or constraint around him; on the contrary, you feel like speaking to him frankly about your work and any difficulties you may be having.

One time the colonel was inspecting the Lenin Rooms and sleeping quarters and looking into the household services rooms.

"I don't see any changes for the better," he observed. "You aren't giving enough thought to the soldier and to his comfort in the barracks."

His words seemed offensive and insulting at first. We thought we were adhereing to required procedures in what we were doing, and besides, things weren't any worse in our organization than they were in our neighboring units.

"Well, see how you measure up against the best," the division commander continued. "Go over to the battalion [division] and see Lieutenant Colonel Baranskiy...."

I couldn't restrain myself; I went over that very day. Yevgeniy Ignat'yevich greeted me warmly and showed me everything I was interested in. I then began to feel the scepticism I had been harboring disappear. For everywhere within the battalion there were to be observed only cleanliness, good order and comfort. And this although there wasn't anything unnecessary. I noticed that the troops here looked happier and in their frame of mind were militant, enthusiastic and aggressive. But then Baranskiy explained that it was at first difficult to stir people to mount a campaign for better living conditions, but now the troops themselves look after and maintain order in the unit, and they don't allow anybody to throw their paper and cigarette butts where they're not supposed to go.

Lieutenant Colonel Baranskiy opened my eyes to a lot of things that day. He is an experienced commander; in the three years under his command the battalion has joined the ranks of our outstanding military units (Baranskiy left us the other day for an assignment in another garrison). And on my way back to the regiment I reflected deeply on the fastest way for us to incorporate his experience in our own unit operations.

Came the spring and the regiment was preparing for its training exercises. The division commander phoned and inquired whether I had received the paperwork. I replied in the affirmative. What activities had we planned? I ran down the list in order. I also reported that I had decided to work over in detail with my officers all aspects of march organization. That was one of our weak spots, so we really had to single it out and work on it. I then went briefly over the topics for the lectures I had scheduled. The division commander expressed interest in who would be giving the first lecture, who the second, the third.... But all my replies were the same: I would be.

I couldn't see Vladimir Georgiyevich's face at the other end of the line, but I could tell by the tone of his voice, a voice that was different now, that he was now frowning.

"That won't do," the colonel declared in concluding our conversation.

The next day he visited the regiment. He listened to my report on preparations for the training exercises and then said:

"You would probably argue the thing this way: I am the sole commander in charge here, I'm the one who knows what the situation is when it comes to solving all the problems; I know what I want and what I expect, and that's the way it'll be. You are indeed the commander, you're in charge of everything in the regiment; but that doesn't mean that you alone know everything. The fact is that you have standing behind you a formation of tens and hundreds of people. Each person has his own fund of knowledge and experience, one might possess more of these resources, another less, but you have all of them under your own personal control--now you have at your disposal here a source of enormous strength and support!

"Now your preparations for your training exercises," the division commander continued. "You're not going to get very far on your own energy and knowledge alone. Go talk things over with your deputy for political affairs and the party committee secretary...and I think the matter would even merit bringing up at a party meeting.

"Now then...about the lectures you have planned. There is no question but that these topics are urgent and timely. But wouldn't it be better to have a conference? You yourself could present a report and then turn the floor over to the service chiefs and subunit (podrazdeleniye) commanders. It would be easier to arrive at the best answers and solutions if you acted together, collectively."

We then moved into a discussion dealing especially with the mutual relationships I had established with my closest assistants. These had not in all instances taken shape easily or comfortably; there were problems and costs to be encountered in this area as well.

"Be of the utmost exactingness in the demands you make of them; this is the proper approach," the division commander declared. "But at the same time demonstrate a respect for each one of them as human beings, for their age and maturity; value their knowledge and experience; talk things over with them frequently. Then will come the trust and mutual understanding."

No, the division commander did not dictate his own will or impose any ready-made solutions of his own. On the contrary, he seemed to be inviting me to join him in the consideration of these matters; and when he arrived at his conclusions, I found myself persuaded. I'm not saying that I made any such discoveries for myself, but I did begin to look at a lot of things through different eyes and to evaluate more critically my own mistakes and miscalculations. Here was the striking thing: I hadn't ever made mistakes like this in any of the positions I had held before, but it had become clear that in this instance I had been so overwhelmed by the sheer volume of duties and responsibilities involved that I had somehow, imperceptibly, developed these warped views.

Well, as it turned out, of course, we held our conference instead of the lectures, to the greater benefit of the matters at hand.

I also learned a beneficial lesson in the course of our command-staff exercises. I prepared for them like I would have for the biggest examination. As things turned out, they stirred the military enthusiasm of our people.

As the exercises proceeded, it appeared that we weren't guilty of any serious miscalculations in our organization for combat, although there were occasional hitches. Neither had we prepared our maps and other documents any worse than had our neighbors.

It was with a certain joyous impatience that I proceeded to the exercise critique. I didn't think we'd land a 5, but 4 seemed like a reasonable rating.

The division commander had directed the exercises, and he now conducted the critique as well. And then I heard the rating..."satisfactory." Everything within my soul rose up against it!

Following the critique I went to see the division commander. I had cooled off some by then, but my agitation had still not died down completely; and as I spoke, I was aware of a slight quiver in my voice:

"I want to make sure I understand why you gave us this rating."

"I was waiting for you to ask this question," the colonel replied. "I was even getting ready to invite you in. I'm glad you came on your own."

And then calmly, point by point, he went over and toted up all our minuses. How many we had accumulated, especially in the area of staff work! Our chief of staff had been promoted, leaving Captain Khramov behind in that position. He had had a hard time of it during the exercises; he came into it with only slight experience. And then I hadn't been able to help him with everything.

But the colonel went on:

"Let me emphasize that your staff officers performed their duties in a conscientious manner. Each one taken individually accomplished his tasks well. But there was no overall coordination, no teamwork, in their operations. The way it turned out, all the musicians were playing their individual parts correctly, but they still didn't amount to an orchestra. And why do you think that was the case? You failed to provide them with strong direction and leadership...."

Yes, our rating had been justified. And such was the iron logic of the division commander.

There were many lessons like this over the course of the year, some substantial and important, some not so, but all were instructive. Vladimir Georgiyevich also found time to talk to me about theoretical ideological and professional training and about the delicate little secrets connected with personnel indoctrination. And one time he found out that I had "cut loose" on somebody, that I had used some sharp language in reprimanding one of my officers.

"So now you've used abusive language with this man and you may figure you've achieved some indoctrinational goal," the division commander observed. "But no, far from it; you've achieved just the opposite. Try to get a look into that man's soul--there you'll see boiling up the unexpressed hurt he feels and the offense he's taken."

At that point there did not simply come to mind, but rather I would say there brightly shone out, the memory of one particular incident. I was still serving as a deputy commander at the time, and in my presence on one

occasion the senior commander gave voice to some sharp, offensive words with a regimental commander. I began to feel ill at ease at that point; I didn't know where to turn my eyes. I watched as the commander's face first turned white as snow, then flushed with a cover of poppy-flower crimson....

But what was it that drove me to this display of rudeness and incivility? The tense, stressful situation, some momentary impulse? The fact was, though, that the division commander had to face situations more critical and fraught with greater stress and pressure. In the course of the exercises we had just completed, for example, I saw for myself.... And not once did he ever lose his temper, but rather spoke with people in a calm, steady voice, issuing his orders and instructions in an efficient, business-like manner. Yes, we ought to learn the meaning of tact from him.

I have also become indebted for a lot in the course of the year to the chief of the division's political section. Yuriy Vasil'yevich has more than once discussed with me the commander's course of conduct in connection with party matters and his ability to accustom himself to listening to the views and advice of his communists and to derive lessons from criticism.

In the regimental party organization I have become aware of the fact that I have here a militant fighting force. Every party meeting has become what I might refer to as an event for me. I listen to the communists, and I feel in my heart that they themselves are concerned about the disturbed by the same problems I am. I find that a source of delight, for by working together it is easier to pull any load. I won't hide the fact that I feel it deeply and that it pains and annoys me when communists criticize deficiencies in training or competition...it usually turns out that I have overlooked something or slipped up somewhere.... But I always try to suppress any annoyance or hurt feelings and strive to get at the rational kernel contrained within the criticism; I try to think of a way to rectify the situation. This is the approach to things we are all learning from the division commander. He has, incidentally, discussed this subject with me many times.

I still can't say that everything is going well for me. There remain mistakes and weak spots in my performance. Here not long ago I was criticized at a meeting. The criticism was that things still remain undone in Agarkov's regiment in the effort to insure strict adherence to regulation procedures. Then one of the officers summed up the matter. This has been a painful business, of course. But here again, there's a lesson for us to learn: we have somehow lost sight of this man and so weren't aware of this weak spot in his character. This means we have to improve the work we do at the individual level.

So you can see that this has been something of a difficult year for me. But it's been a delightful and heartening one as well. I have been able to observe people grow and mature; we are promoting several officers and seeing

them off to other garrisons. And now the regiment is getting its new replacements from the schools. I'm awaiting my encounter with them with a great deal of interest. What kind of people will these new lieutenants turn out to be, what new and innovative things will they add to the life of the regiment?

[Author's concluding comments] When Igor' Ivanovich finished his story, I asked him how things were going with is poetry--it probably hadn't been as difficult a time for growth and development in this area. The lieutenant colonel's expression warmed slightly, a smile then lighting up his face with its stiff brush of a moustache:

"Oh, I'm still writing poems, all right, although the thing goes by fits and starts. It's relief for the soul. Some of them have been read over the radio...."

Along toward evening that day, we met once more with Lieutenant Colonel Agar'kov at division headquarters. Tall, lean, taut, well-disciplined, he headed for our vehicle, and striding in step behind him two lieutenants, both quite young, no moustaches, in fresh, brand new uniforms.

"Some of our new arrivals in the regiment," he declared in introducing the young officers. "These aren't simply men; these are eagles. They've graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Command...."

The lieutenants looked a little confused at this and not at all like eagles, but their regimental commander probably viewed them as such in the future--and a not too distant future at that.

8963
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MOTORIZED RIFLE UNIT ALPINE TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 79 p 1

[Article: "Up There, Above the Clouds"]

[Text] These photographs were taken at an altitude of 2500 meters in the Tyan'-Shan' Mountains. For motorized rifle troops this is routine training: Ascent, negotiating a canyon and a water obstacle. This is simply one more test of the state of their professional training. And despite the fact that they are already fatigued, despite the streams of sweat rolling down from under their helmets, the troops attack with speed and drive and destroy their objectives with well-aimed fire and accurate grenade throws. It's hard for the "enemy" to resist against such pressure. An attack must always be bold, swift and sudden. This is especially important for success in combat here in the mountains. And this is precisely the manner in which the motorized rifle troops attack.

And unit (chast') or any company might boast of its sharp-shooting riflemen or its outstanding athletes. Each man in the company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Sergey Polozov displays the highest level of morale--the specific nature of their mission requires it. Then of course, there's always the example set them by their commander--he's always in the lead (in the foreground in the photo below: communist Senior Lieutenant S. Polozov; right: PFC S. Budon).

Prior to their service in the army, none of the company's troops had ever made such difficult climbs or participated in rock-climbing competitions. But that's what they've learned here. All this is referred to in everyday language simply as "mountain training." The company devotes special attention to this, just as it does to physical training: A soldier must possess endurance and strength; he would otherwise be unable to conquer the mountain heights.

Even though he has to train until he "sweats blood," none of the men in the company regrets his assignment to this very unit. The mountains don't pardon any weakness; they do contition and toughen a man's character. To

negotiate this canyon, along the bottom of which a mountain river swiftly flows, is now a matter of only a few minutes for PFC K. Latymkhanov (in the photo above, right). Especially as his movements are insured and supported by the trusty hands of his friends.

The troops try to derive the maximum possible use and benefit from each hour of training and are striving to fulfill this year's obligation to make theirs an outstanding-rated company. Lieutenant Yuriy Chepurdey (he and PFC B. Karimov in photo at left) leads one of the outstanding platoons. The young officer has achieved successes in the year since he completed his work at the Alma-Ata All-Arms Higher Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev and established his authority in the eyes of his men.

So go their regular duty days. And so go the service and training of the men who carry an ice axe along with their automatic weapon. It would be impossible without it up there where the beckoning peaks tower and where the crested clouds glide by on occasion below these peaks.

8963
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COMBAT ENGINEERS ALPINE TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Major M. Malygin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "A Combat Engineer's Mathematics"]

[Text] The regimental chief of staff indicated a point on the map with the sharp point of his pencil. It was at this point, here at the approaches to the mountain ridge, that the subunit of combat engineers commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant B. Filonenko was to put up its barrier line.

Why was this line necessary? As first echelon subunits were approaching the ridge, reconnaissance reported "enemy" reserves advancing toward it from the other side. They had to be prevented from seizing a favorable line and their plans disrupted. But this would be possible only on condition that the "enemy" advance could be halted while he was still at the approach to the pass. This was the mission assigned the combat engineers.

Guards Senior Lieutenant Filonenko turned his eyes away from his map and slammed the plotting board shut. He didn't need his map yet. Up ahead protruding sternly were the sharp teeth of the rocky cliffs. A canyon leading to the pass cuts through the ridge. A little farther down a mountain river squeezes between the cliffs. They're putting in a reinforced concrete bridge across it. The gentle slopes leading down to the river do not preclude the possibility of "enemy vehicle and equipment crossing on the river bed itself. This is all clear enough. But now the question is: what is the best way to utilize the time allowed for the execution of the mission, what would be the best way to allocate the available forces? That requires a little thought.

So Filonenko began to figure the alternatives, who to send and where. The terrain did not permit the use of engineer equipment. One group would therefore lay an antitank mine field on the opposite bank of the river, the other the "enemy's" probable dismounting line. Preparations had to made for blowing up the bridge, fougasses planted in the sides of the cliffs on both sides of the canyon....

Here is how the regimental chief of staff evaluated the commander's performance in the first phase of the operation:

"I explained the mission to the commander in general terms. In doing so, of course, I was taking into consideration the high level of training achieved by Senior Lieutenant Filonenko and all personnel in his subunit. They have demonstrated this in the course of routine training and special tactical exercises. In my view, the commander performed with skill in this tactical situation as well. He first competently analyzed the terrain and the "enemy's" most probably lines of advance in both pre-battle and battle formations; he foresaw a possible dismounting line and ordered the planting of directional mines there. Guards Senior Lieutenant Filonenko also correctly solved the problem of the location of the antitank mine field--closer to the waterline.... In a word, he has a good understanding of his combat engineering mathematics."

Combat engineering mathematics.... That means that everything requries accurate calculations. How much explosive is required for the mines planted in crevices in the cliffs to act as rock fougasses? On which parts of the mountain slopes are mines to be laid? How strong a charge is required to blow up the bridge supports...? Plus tactics. Yes, tactics were the commander's first consideration. Tactical requirements lay at the basis of the execution of highly specialized missions as well, for the fact was that these combat engineers were performing in the interest of all-arms combat operations.

Guards Senior Lieutenant Filonenko soon received a report concerning the appearance of an "enemy" combat reconnaissance patrol. The officer immediately called over Guards Senior Sergeant V. Fedorenko and ordered him to halt the patrol's advance at the distant approaches to the site of these operations. The blocking group was supplied with the quantity of mines it would need. It then moved on ahead and quickly blocked off the tank-threatened directions with mine chains. The "Enemy" tanks were trapped in a narrow defile. No little time passed while his engineers cleared the area of mines.

"Guards Senior Lieutenant Filonenko displayed intelligent initiative in this situation," declared the regimental chief of staff. "He diverted part of his forces away from their primary mission of putting up the barrier line, but he gained time in doing so. We cannot leave unmentioned the level of training displayed by his men and their ability to act boldly and decisively. Taking local conditions into consideration, these combat engineers creatively utilized practical front-line experience. As we know, our combat engineers made frequent use of mine chains in the Great Patriotic War. So Guards Senior Lieutenant Filonenko's men took this example as a basis for thier own operations in this situation. It should be pointed out that, generally speaking, combat engineers play a very important role in achieving success in mountain combat operations. They are capable of operating both independently and directly as a component of a battle formation. Practical experience indicates that barrier lines skillfully put up by combat engineers are highly effective in mountain terrain."

So now the fougasses have been planted in the cliffs. The mine fields have been laid. The men have concealed in a secure spot the blasting machine which would be used to activate the fougasses, the charges under the bridge supports and the directional mines. The blocking group has now returned after successfully accomplishing its mission. The engineers take cover.

"Enemy" reconnaissance has already appeared at the bridge. His main forces were then approaching the foot of the mountain. He had had no easy progress in his combat operations due to the difficulties encountered in negotiating the obstacles put up by the engineers.

"The fact that the subunit of combat engineers commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant Filonenko demonstrated a high level of training in the course of the exercise is highly characteristic," the chief of staff declared. "Their commander concerns himself continuously with the matter of bringing up the class ratings of his men and insuring their mastery of related specialty skills. Came the exercise and, the situation calling for it, a vehicle driver set to work preparing a charge, the senior driver began 'tying' the electrical circuit, an electrician went to work on the calculations...."

Interchangeability is indeed one of this subunit's strong points. No matter what his position, no matter what his primary duty responsibilities, virtually every specialist in the unit knows everything an engineer has to know and be able to do under combat conditions. This one of the indicators of this unit's maturity and of the deep sense of responsibility each man feels for the combat readiness of his subunit and unit (chast'), for the fulfillment of the obligations it has assumed and for bringing the training year to a successful conclusion.

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TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS: COMPLAINT AND COMMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Major M. Ziyemin'sh: "What 'We Don't Have Time' For, Correspondence Follow-Up"]

> [Text] Platoon leader Lieutenant I. Kuznetsov reported in a letter to the editors that the smooth functioning of the training process within the regiment to which he is assigned is being disrupted and that there is toleration of formalism in the organization of socialist competition. He further indicated in his letter that in the course of test and qualification exercises, individual authorities are meanwhile attempting to conceal the true state of affairs; they are going so far as the outright use of eyewash and are even encouraging their subordinates to do the same.
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> KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's permanent correspondent with the Far East Military District visited the unit from which this letter had been sent. Here is his report.

At this busy time toward the end of the training year, when every hour is especially valuable, it was strange to see training center facilities standing empty. Also at a loss for something to explain this development was Warrant Officer N. Dyuzhakov, chief of the BMP [infantry combat vehicle] moving target gunnery range, who had for several days been expecting the arrival of personnel for fire training and who was still waiting. As it turned out, this wasn't the first time this had happened: the range utilization procedure approved by the authority concerned was not being followed.

As later proved to be the case, the personnel of some subunits were at that time engaged in activities far removed from military training. For example, many were working in a local brickyard. If these subunits were not up to full strength, their special-purpose teams were working somewhere else. So

this particular day wasn't any exception. And as the facts indicate, such has been the practice here in previous times as well. Here's an example. Serving in one of the subunits are Privates D. Basnash, A. Vinyukov, N. Khayrulin and B. Sokolov, who had taken on the obligations to train and study for "good" and "outstanding" ratings. But not once did they attend training or instruction in the course of the entire summer training period. The reason was the same: time off to work in industry.

While still in the course of its winter training period, the platoon led by Lieutenant A. Zelikov assumed the obligation to achieve an "outstanding" rating. But came the spring and it showed results of only "satisfactory." And even now the people aren't entirely certain that they will achieve what they set out to: only little study and training is required of them. You get the impression that reactions have become dulled to this sort of thing here. Lieutenant Colonel V. Kazachenko, for example, with whom we spoke in the formation political section and drove to the training center, declared that what was important was the very fact that personnel attended training. How many people attended and whether they were well-trained and well-prepared were matters that they just didn't have time for. It was strange, of course, to hear this coming from a political officer.

Neither can we remain silent about the following incident. The regiment conducted fire training test and qualification exercises fairly recently involving the participation of officers from the district's combat training directorate. Firing was the company under the acting command of Senior Lieutenant V. Yepifantsev. From the very first results it was clear that the company was threatened with an "unsatisfactory" rating. So in an attempt to "save" the situation, Major A. Stambrovskiy, then acting battalion commander, suggested to Lieutenant I. Kuznetsov that he fire for his men. Not wanting to engage in any bargaining with his conscience, the latter refused. Thanks to the principled stand taken by this young officer, that attempted eye-washing did not succeed.

Incidents like this naturally do not go unnoticed. Many people are aware of the negative consequences of attempts at eye-washing and of disruptions or breakdowns in the smooth execution of a training program. Senior Lieutenant A. Paukov, Lieutenant V. Fedorov and others spoke at a party meeting and expressed their concern about the situation. But their voices were not listened to. The shortcomings found to be tolerated were not given any fundamental, thoroughgoing analysis. Attempts on the part of several subunits to fulfill their obligations in competition were finding themselves just as before under the threat of disruption and failure. It was at that point that Lieutenant Kurnetsov wrote his letter to the editors. And he wrote objectively.

So here we cannot leave out of our account some mention of the attitude demonstrated after this by individual officers. Instead of supporting the young officer and turning all their efforts toward eliminating these deficiencies, they are abusing and criticizing him. They occasionally remark

to Kuznetsov that he is saying with what Lieutenant Colonel Kazachenko refers to as his "scribbling" that he wants to secure some special privileges for himself. And those he criticized, such as Major Stambrovskiy, for example, are keeping a continuous watch on every move he makes. This is--and we will put it bluntly--a nonparty attitude. There is no doubt but that it must be looked at and examined in a thoroughgoing manner. Just as must be done in the case of the deficiencies in the manner of operation of those officers responsible for the toleration shown shortcomings in the organization of combat training and socialist competition.

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COMPLAINTS ABOUT FURLOUGH REGISTRATION PROBLEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Major V. Saranchev, Red Banner Far East Military District: "How a Problem Arose, Letter to the Editors"]

[Text] As everybody knows, military personnel arriving at a temporary duty or leave destination are required to sign in with the directorate of the camp military commandant. And to sign out before departing for thier duty stations. This is no complicated matter, and it would appear that no problems should ever arise in this connection. However....

After arriving in the city in which I was to spend my leave, I immediately decided to stop in at the commandant's office. But as it turned out, neither the military commandant nor his assistant were on duty. This despite the fact that the schedule of operations for the commandant's office hanging at the entrance read: "Personnel Sign-In/Sign-Out--1100-1300." It was during precisely that period that I had come to the commandant's office.

So there wasn't any "sign in" that day. I had to make another trip to the commandant's office.

Remembering my lesson, I went to sign out a few days prior to my actual departure. But again, neither the commandant nor his assistant were on duty. That was Saturday. And according to the schedule, Sunday was their day off. So together with other troops on leave, of whom there collected no small number, I got in line at the commandant's office early Monday morning. The sergeant on duty in the commandant's office, Junior Sergeant Yu. Sin'ko declared assuringly:

"Senior Lieutenant Tret'yak, the deputy commandant, has to get here first. Lieutenant Colonel Sadovoy himself has gone on leave."

"This is the second time I've come here to sign out," Captain 3d Rank G. Shevchenko declared with some indignation.

It wasn't difficult to understand: the people here weren't following their schedule, which had been approved by higher authority. But the commandant's office personnel were apparently taking as a basis for their operations the assumption that people on leave didn't have anywhere to be going in a hurry.

This is an example of how problems are sometimes created in the simplest of matters, when people fail to demonstrate the required responsibility in their attitude toward the performance of their duties.

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FORMATION AND IMPORTANCE OF GUARDS UNITS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Soviet Guard"]

[Text] As Soviet troops were demonstrating unprecedented endurance and heroism in the heaviest fighting against the German fascist invaders, an order was issued in September 1941 signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the Red Army General Staff taking note of the exceptional military valor demonstrated by the 100th, 127th, and 153d and 161st Rifle Divisions, which in fighting for the motherland had provided models of bravery, valor, discipline and good organization. For their military exploits, good organization, discipline and exemplary unit order and procedures, these outstanding formations were redesignated by this order the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Guards Divisions respectively.

And so was begun the creation of the Soviet Guard. Other military formations were also awarded the eminent Guards title in the subsequent course of the war. The 29th Red Banner Fighter Regiment became the 1st Guards Air Regiment. Among the first navy ships to be awarded the Guards title were the cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkaz" and the destroyer "Stoykiy." The units and formations awarded the Guards title were presented Guards battle flags, the ships Guards naval ensigns. Guards badges were instituted for military personnel of Guards units and ships. Guards military ranks were also introduced.

The establishment of the Soviet Guard is one of the important steps our party has taken in the area of military development. It has played an enormous role in strengthening the combat capability of our armed forces. Guards regiments, ships, divisions, corps and armies inflicted crushing blows on the enemy and provided models of limitless devotion to the socialist motherland, an unshakable will to victory and endurance and tenacity.

The Soviet Guard has won undying glory. Every soldier and sailor, sergeant and petty officer, every officer, general and admiral has considered it a high honor to carry the title of Guardsman and to go into battle under the colors of the Guard. The Guard was sent to the most difficult, the most critical sectors of the front and in all instances honored itself in the

manner in which it executed its missions. Not without reason was it said during the war: "The enemy can't hold out where the Guard attacks;" "The enemy won't penetrate where the Guard is defending." Undeviating adherence to these percepts and unshakable loyalty to their military oath made Guards units the best in our army.

Men for a high level of duty and responsibility. Such were the Guardsmen of the war years, and such are now striving to be those entrusted with service in the Guard in our time. An while units and ships are not redesignated as Guards organizations in peacetime, the military renown of the Soviet Guard lives and will live on. For the purpose of keeping these military traditions alive, Guards designations belonging to units, ships, formations and large units may, upon their disbandment, be transferred to other large units, formations, units and ships. Just as was the case with their predecessors, a high moral-political and military quality distinguish today's Guardsmen. By their military labors they are making a most important contribution to the effort to increase the combat strength of our Armed Forces. "I am sure that in the future as well you, comrades Guardsmen," this declared Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a letter to personnel of the Guards Port-Arturskiy Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District, "along with all Soviet fighting men, will be sparing no efforts conscientiously, persistently and with some sense of urgency to master your first-rate weaponry, assimilate the knowledge and science of achieving victory forged in past battles for the motherland and nurture in yourselves an ideological firmness and steadfastness, bravery and boldness."

Our Guards troops are contributing much toward the development of new techniques and methods of employing weapons and equipment and to the effort to achieve high levels of effectiveness and quality in combat training. In their exercises, training flights and naval cruises, they strive to perform with initiative, decisiveness, boldness, that is, in the manner come to be expected of Guardsmen. And this in turn insures high ratings in combat and political training and in increasing combat readiness to their formations, units and ships. It came as no coincidence that among the first to be awarded the eminent designation of outstanding formation were the Guards Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin and the Guards Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Rogachevskaya Motorized Rifle Divison imeni Supreme Soviet of the BSSR. And now today, in the final phase of not only their summer training, but of their entire training year, Guards troops are in the van of the effort to achieve maximum effectiveness in the utilization of training time, first-rate execution of all combat training missions and complete fulfillment of obligations in socialist competition.

Now to bear the designation of Guardsman is not only an honor, but entails responsibilities as well. We have to insure that all personnel to whom it has fallen to serve in the Guard thoroughly understand this. It is important that prevailing everywhere are conditions insuring that from the very beginning of his service in a Guards unit or on a Guards ship, every officer,

warrant officer, NCO, and rank-and-file enlisted man snese surrounding him an atmosphere of friendship and comradeliness and the Guards' traditional military esprit and be imbued with a sense of responsibility for the high honor of serving in the Guard. All must understand that discharging responsibilities in the manner expected of Guardsmen means to discharge them in an outstanding manner and to develop within themselves courage and boldness and a readiness to execute with honor at any time the patriotic and international responsibilities of a Soviet fighting man.

The entire atmosphere and mode of lie maintained within Guards formations, units and ships; exemplary adherence to prescribed internal and shipboard procedures; an efficiently organized internal and shipboard duty routine; everything, in fact, that our armed forces are doing as a school of both labor and military training and for the development of moral purity and personal courage, all these things must contribute to the development of high moral-political attributes and morale and to the ability to demonstrate continuous self-discipline, efficiency, dependability and that extra smartness in personal appearance characteristic of Guardsmen both in and out of formation. Called upon to play an important role in this regard are the daily political and indoctrinational activities carried out by commanders and party and Kimsomal organizations and dramatic and clearly presented publicity given to the heroic traditions of the Guard and the past military exploits of preceding unit comrades-in-arms. Preparations for the 35th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War should be extensively utilized for these purposes. We need to enhance the indoctrinational importance attached to military ritual. The carrying of the battle flag with the Guards ribbon attached to its staff, the presentation of Guards badges, the taking of the military oath--all these things must serve to mobilize Guardsmen for self-sacrificing performance of their military duties.

The Soviet Guard has entered dramatic pages in the military annals of our Armed Forces. And now, but its own steadfast military labors, today's generation of Guardsmen is augmenting and enriching its glorious trations. The sons and grandsons of the fighting men who held out in '41 and who emerged victorious in '45 now see their duty to lie in striving persistently to improve their mastery of combat skills, maintaining continuous vigilance in the performance of their military duties and in working tirelessly to increase the combat readiness of our armed forces.

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TRAINING AIDS AND FACILITIES STANDARDIZATION DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant General A. Matveyenko: "Taking Present-Day Requirements Into Consideration, The Main Things are Efficiency and Quality"]

[Text] The role played by resources in the form of training equipment and facilities is a great one in connection with accomplishing the task of further improving the quality and effectiveness of military training. The Ground Forces, as well as other services of our Armed Forces, are devoting continuous attention to improving and modernizing it on the basis of advancements achieved in the areas of science and technology. These efforts are not being undertaken haphazardly or in accordance with the "let's tear down the old one and build a new one" principle, but rather in a highly organized and well-directed manner.

It formerly occurred that units would "invent" and their own personnel make their mock-ups and display stands and put up their own training facilities, relying in the process on their own taste and resources. This would lead to inefficient utilization of training facility equipment and, on occasion, to the development of facilities which failed to measure up to the requirements of the Course in Marksmanship. Recent years have witnessed the development and dissemination of a series of documents on methods, the specification of unified, model plans for unit and formation training equipment and facilities, provision made for their standardization and regulations established governing their utilization. One of these documents is an album of diagrams and plans for training facilities and fields specifying the number of training facilities which are to be equipped and including a list of training sites.

Field and classroom training facilities developed in accordance with present-day requirements provide comprehensive, integrated and effective subunit under conditions approaching actual combat conditions to the maximum possible extent. Also of no small importance is the fact that their proper utilization yields economies in weapons and other resources and reductions in energy and fuel consumption.

The truth of all this may be confirmed by the life and combat training regime prevailing in leading units and subunits. Instructive in this

regard is the practical experience accumulated by the motorized rifle regiment under the command of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Ya. Rybak. The staff and party organization in this unit devote constant attention to improving and further developing its training equipment and facilities. All field training facilities here measure up to established requirements. Exercises are well-organized and conducted at the appropriate levels of intensity. Every trainee involved experiences high degrees of stress. The well-equipped training facilities, in which are operational all authorized positions providing comprehensive, integrated subunit training, insure this result. The best officer methods specialists familiarize themselves without delay with the latest in training equipment--layer and gunner controls and simulators for tanker fire training--which is then incorporated in the training routine. Achieved thereby are a maximum intensification of the training process and high quality in combat training.

Unfortunately, however, the same state of affairs does not prevail universally. The training facilities and equipment in some Ground Forces units does not measure up to present-day requirements. Work on the development of up-to-date training centers occasionally moves ahead only slowly, in some instances deviating from the standard plans. Training equipment in some places is not maintained in repair, is not serviced at the required intervals and is frequently operated until it is simply worn out. The training position control panel equipment is in unsatisfactory condition in a number of instances, the programming unit functioning only intermittently. All such things inject a disorganizing element into the training process and effects the level of quality achieved in accomplishing combat training plans.

Serious deficiencies in the condition of training facilities and equipment were discovered, for example, in the unit where responsibility for them rests with Lieutenant Colonel A. Rodimtsev. Unskilled, incompetent operation of training facility equipment has resulted in this instance in delays and disruptions of exercises, even during a period of qualification tests.

Equipment designated for utilization in the development of training facilities has in the case of some units been used, not for its originally intended purpose, but rather to meet unimportant, secondary requirements, and this while work on the construction of training facilities already begun falls behind schedule. This has been the case, for example, in the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel V. Shilov is in charge of the training facility.

Nor can we neglect to mention the fact that existing field and classroom training facilities are not always efficiently utilized. What happens is that, while the equipment in such instances makes it possible to intensify the training process, exercises are nevertheless conducted under oversimplified conditions. A comprehensive, integrated approach to activities in individual areas of training is rarely the practice here. Failure to service training facility equipment at the proper intervals is a serious deficiency lowering the quality of training in this unit. Drastic and determined measures should be taken to eliminate these deficiencies.

Simulators are acquiring ever increasing importance in troop training practice. The incorporation of simulators in the training process makes it possible to reduce wear and tear on costly military equipment and cut ammunition consumption and provides an opportunity to simulate the various conditions under which trainees might be forced to operate and to repeat numerous times operations connected with the combat employment of weapons and equipment.

Simulators and simulator systems, which comprise motion picture and television equipment and laser and other instruments, are being increasingly extensively employed in the process of training drives, gun layer-operators and other specialists. The Guards Shavlinskiy Motorized Rifle Regiment is making skillful use of its simulator training equipment. Care is taken here to utilize each minute to the maximum effectiveness. The classroom facility containing motion-picture simulators for training PTURS [anti-tank guided missile] operators utilizes more than 20 sound films, which may be used to create a variety of tactical situations on the screen. Training instructors may assign trainees a variety of missions and make fire adjustments. Similar capabilities exist within many units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and of the Moscow and Ural Military Districts.

A competition for the best field training facilities and equipment is currently under way within the Ground Forces for the purpose of improving training facilities and equipment. The final results will be totaled this coming December. The task set has been by the end of the competition to complete the development of up-to-date training facilities in all units and formations, to bring them fully into line with the requirements contained in the guiding documentation and to complete work on the equipment of existing facilities.

Significant progress in these areas is to be noted within the Belorussian, Carpathian and a number of other military districts and groups of forces. Commanders, staffs and political organizations are skillfully incorporating into training practice here all forward-looking proposals recommended during central and district training methods meetings and in the methods manuals. Training facilities have been preliminarily inspected on the basis of rating criteria specified in the regulations governing the competition.

The competition has not in all instances produced the expected results, however. Much less has been accomplished within a number of units and subunits of the Baltic, Odessa and Transbaykal Military Districts than was originally planned. Facilities here for tactical and special tactical training leave something to be desired. The purposes and tasks of the competition are in some instances only poorly understood, while competition has yet to be initiated for the district's best training facility.

We have in the time remaining to create all conditions necessary for successfully bringing to a close the competition for the best field training

facilities and to monitor continuously the work being done on all construction and installation projects. We need also more extensively to publicize the most outstanding examples of a training facility and to disseminate the practical experience accumulated by the best training center specialists and rationalizers.

A thoroughly modern training facility and its effective utilization in the training process are important levers with which to achieve further improvement in the quality of troop combat and political training. Concern demonstrated for continuous improvement in this area is at the same time a concern for increasing unit and formation combat readiness, one of the decisive conditions for a successful conclusions to the training year and for the fulfillment of socialist obligations.

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COMPLAINT ON DELAY OF GARRISON REPAIRS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Major A. Andriyuk: "They Didn't Learn From Experience, Make Timely Preparations for Winter"]

[Text] I met Major Yu. Solov'yev at the mess hall. I had been told that Yuriy Fedorovich had come to this unit only a few days before and taken up the post of unit economy administrator. People said in this regard that the officer had immediately launched into his work with strong determination.

The gusty Siberian wind lashed our faces with stinging drops of rain. As it began to rain harder, I suggested to my companion that we wait out the storm here.

"We'll get soaked...but that's no great disaster," my interlocutor observed, now stepping up his pace. "The mess hall roof hasn't been repaired, so we can't wait it out here."

"What kept them from repairing the roof during those clear, dry summer days?" I inquired with some interest.

"Well, they say there weren't any materials available. It was only yesterday that the KECh [billeting operations unit] received a few rolls of roofing material, and even that took some doing."

Thus began our discussion of the course of preparations for the long, severe Siberian winter. Major Yu. Solov'yev told me that the unit had created a commission to inspect its buildings and structures, figured up how many repairs had to be made and how long it would take to accomplish them and outlined steps to be taken to repair the heating and fuel supply systems. Nonorganizational repair crews were then formed from among maintenance and unit military personnel.

"We've already done a lot, but we still have a lot more to do," Yuriy Fedorovich declared with some concern as he concluded his story.

As we walked over the post grounds, my attention was caught by half-meter spraying jets of water and steam. Major Yu. Solov'yev explained that that was the outside main carrying steam from the boiler to the mess hall.

"But that's an awfully big leak, and there's no load on the boiler...!"

"Right now we're burning 50 percent more than our daily fuel norm," explained the boiler shift supervisor, Soviet Army employee O. Rusakov. "At one point, the main passes under the ground. Now the rains have started up and the thing is filled up with water at that point. We run the heat continuously, because if the pipes cool off we couldn't "force" any hot steam through them."

People say we learn from experience. That's an old axiom, I believe. But they've forgotten about it here, because last winter brought with it no little difficulty for unit and KECh internal economy administrators, the latter headed up by Lieutenant Colonel V. Azhorin. They had to replace some external heat supply system pipe and remedy some other malfunctions during those crackling cold January days. This naturally had some impact on the frame of mind of military personnel and members of their families.

"We had complaints during our last heating season about insufficient quarters heat, and there'll be more this year," declared with some confidence Soviet Army employee V. Serova, chief of the billeting operations service. "But judge for yourself, there wasn't much time left until the beginning of the heating season, but the quarters radiators remained unflushed from the year before last, and the housing directorate, headed by V. Sedova, still hasn't done anything about them."

To put it bluntly, the state of affairs here with regard to preparations for winter doesn't look the best. One cause for concern, for example, is the fact that there still isn't any hot water in the kindergarten facility. Now this situation has arisen because military construction people under Lieutenant Colonel V. Antonyuk damaged the hot water supply line and haven't been able to repair their damage for a long time now.

Now just how is the billeting operations unit involved in the process of preparing for winter? Major L. Krynochkin, the acting KECh chief, explained that the KECh supplies materials, provides specialists to assist subunit operations and supervises to insure proper utilization of various buildings and communal structures and resources allocated for repairs. But it emerged in the course of our conversation that the billeting operations unit is still concerning itself only little to insure that winter here is to be met fully armed, as we say. A basic problem consists in the fact that there are shortages of materials necessary for repairs: pipe, brick, cement, gypsum, paints, carbide. This is the situation with regard to preparations for winter conditions not only here, but in other quarters areas as well.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn here: the people in this instance failed to learn their lessons from last year. Time has been lost, time

which has now to be made up for with redoubled energy. The combined efforts of commanders, unit economy administrators and KECh personnel are required for dealing successfully with the problems which have arisen and for making good preparations for winter. This requires the best possible organization. Winter won't wait. And in Siberia it comes quickly and unexpectedly.

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CRITICISMS AND COMPLAINTS; FOLLOW-UP REPORTS

Deficiencies in NCO Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] "They Have Not Finished Learning"--this was the name of the correspondence of Lieutenant Colonel V. Shchekotov published on 31 July 1979. It talked about the shortcomings in training NCO's in a number of training subunits of the Ural MD. The editorial staff comment on this correspondence mentioned the fact that similar shortcomings also exist in one of the subunits of the Leningrad MD.

The deputy commander of the Ural MD for combat training, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops I. Podobed, reported to the editorial staff that the correspondence was discussed at an enlarged session of the district military soviet and at a meeting of the headquarters officers of the combined unit. Measured were taken to eliminate the shortcomings which were noted. Demonstration instructional methods exercises on the most complex topics have been conducted for the officers and NCO's of the training subunits with the help of the district headquarters workers. Control over the organization of training has been strengthened. Appropriate actions have been taken against the people who tolerated the deficiencies noted by the newspaper. In particular, for using students for his own ends, Lieutenant Colonel V. Berko was disciplined and his actions were thoroughly evaluated at a meeting of the party commission of the combined unit.

Measures have been taken to increase the quality of NCO training in the training subunit of the Leningrad MD. This was announced in a reply sent to the editorial staff by the deputy district commander for combat training Major General F. Starchenko.

Training Deficiencies Eliminated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] The title "There Have Been Many Inspections" was given to the

correspondence of Lieutenant Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy published on 14 August 1979. It addressed the shortcomings in organizing control over training in a certain unit of the Carpathian MD.

The combined unit commander reported to the editorial staff that this correspondence was discussed in the political section, and at meetings of the party aktiv and unit officers. Concrete measures have been taken to eliminate the shortcomings noted by the newspaper. Exercises have been carried out with commanders and battalion chiefs of staff and with company commanders on organizing a report on the combat training of subunit personnel. Controlled firing and driving exercises as well as exercises on organizing competition reviews have been conducted with the company and platoon commanders. The control over training has been strengthened.

Lost Certificate Finally Presented

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The letter of the military commissar of the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk of Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast Colonel B. Bulyga was published on 10 July 1979 under the headline "A Lost Certificate." The letter told of the chief of the DOSAAF motor vehicle school, Master Sergeant(reserve) F. Zikrach who for more than two years has not been able to obtain a certificate which he was awarded by order of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The assistant commander of the Red Banner Kiev Military District for military training establishments and pre-conscription military training Lieutenant General V. Noskov reported to the editorial staff that comrade Zikrach's certificate was presented. This unpardonable delay was the fault of Colonel P. Brovko who was transferred to the reserve in 1978. The newspaper article was discussed by the officers of the section.

Bad Situation Corrected in SGF

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The correspondence headlined "In Revenge for Criticism" of Colonel Ye. Babynin, published on 27 June 1979, told about an unscrupulous situation which arose in the unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel of Technical Services P. Velichko.

The deputy commander of the SGF/Southern Group of Forces/ for the rear--chief of the rear for the group Lieutenant General M. Polyakov and the chief of the political section of the units and subunits of the rear of the SGF Colonel V. Simakov reported to the editorial staff that a conference took place with the chiefs of the sections and services of the directorate of the rear of the group on the question of improving their work style. The demands on the directors of the military and labor collectives have been increased. Concrete measures have been taken to improve inner-party democracy, and the development of a creative initiative on the part of the communists. Lieutenant Colonel of Technical Services P. Velichko was transferred to the reserves.

Socialist Competition Shortcomings Fixed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The critical correspondence of Major V. Ryazantsev on deficiencies in the management of socialist competition in a certain unit was published on 29 June 1979 under the headline "A Break in the Chain."

The deputy commander of the political directorate of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal MD Colonel N. Laguteyev reported to the editorial staff that the correspondence was discussed in the political section, at a conference of officers and warrant officers(praporshchiki), and at a seminar of secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations. Concrete measures were outlined and are being carried out to improve the management of socialist competition during training. Demonstration and instructional methods exercises on managing competition have been conducted for all subunit officers.

Measures have been taken to eliminate the shortcomings noted by the newspaper in the work of the unit staff. Control over combat training has been strengthened to avoid oversimplifications and indulgences in training. Special attention is being paid to the organization of competition by tasks and norms.

A demonstration exercise on organizing party and political work on servicing day was carried out for all poli ical workers and party and Komsomol activists of the unit.

Improved Military Equipment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ "After the Line of the Order" was the name of the correspondence of Major M. Ziyemin'ich, published on 8 August 1979. It disclosed shortcomings in the organization of control over the upkeep of combat equipment in a certain regiment of the Far Eat MD.

The chief of the political section of the combined unit reported to the editorial staff that the correspondence was discussed by the officers of the unit, and by the party and Komsomol aktivs. The question of the personal responsibility of communist leaders for the condition of equipment was also examined at an enlarged session of the unit party committee which discussed what was said in the newspaper. The subunit commanders and chiefs of arms and services participated in the discussion. Measures have been planned to eliminate the deficiencies.

Officers of the staff and political section of the combined unit are providing concrete assistance to the commanders, political workers, and the engineering and technical employees of the regiment in the struggle to increase the effectiveness of planned tasks for technical and other types of combat training. Measures have been adopted to strengthen military equipment propaganda.

Military Commissariat Shortcomings Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ A letter from the Pinyugalov family of Leningrad with a commentary by our correspondent on shortcomings in the work with draftees of the military commissariat headed by Liutenant Colonel V. Bovin was published on 21 July 1979 under the headline "Thus a Complaint Was Born." Colonel Prokhorov, acting Leningrad city military commissar, reported to the editorial staff that the newspaper article was considered at conferences of officers and warrant officers(praporshchiki) of the city and rayon military commissariats. Concrete measures have been taken to improve their work, and to prevent the type of deficiencies noted by the newspaper.

Various Complaints Investigated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The serviceman Primkhulov reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA concerning the improper activities of the officer Pronin who, in violation of the regulations covering breaches of discipline, crossed out entries in the warning document of motor vehicle drivers. The garrison commander, the officer Komarchuk, responded to the enquiry of the editorial staff. He reported that the facts had been corroborated. Lieutenant Colonel Pronin was severely warned to ban in the future the non-regulation punishments of subordinates.

Sergeant Filippov wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about the untimely issuance of clothing to subunit personnel. Colonel Subbotin conducted an investigation of this case in accordance with a request of the editorial staff and reported that the subunit where Sergeant Filippov serves did indeed violate the time periods for issuing clothing. Warrant Officer(praporshchik) Andreyev was removed from his post for the careless execution of his service duties. At the present time all of the servicemen have been provided with clothing.

The Kiev Rayon voyenkomat/military registration and enlistment office/ of the city of Simferopol' did not pay proper attention to World War II veteran Yermokhin when he came to obtain a temporary certificate. Comrade Yermokhin wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about this. Colonel Petrosyan, the chief of the political section of the Crimean Oblast voyenkomat, replied that the facts had been confirmed. Workers at the rayon voyenkomat, comrades Dryga and Osipov, have been summarily punished. This case was discussed at a seminar of secretaries of primary party organizations of the oblast voyenkomats.

Individuals living on a military post, comrades Kravchuk, Skopintsevoy, and others, wrote a letter concerning the violations of Soviet trade rules and the rudeness of salespersons at post exchange number 201. The editorial staff sent this complaint to the trade directorate of the Siberian MD. Lieutenant Colonel Skryabikov answered that an inspection confirmed the facts. It was pointed out to the chief of the PX, comrade Vinokurov, that it was necessary to strengthen control over the work of the trade points.

Work of Lecturers Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ "What Must a Lecturer Be Concerned With" was the name of the article by Colonel V. Izgarshev published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 5 August 1979. A member of the military soviet, chief of the political directorate of the VVS/air force/ Colonel General of Aviation I. Moroz, reported that the newspaper article was largely correct in noting the deficiencies existing in the management of the work of the staff lecturers of the political directorate of the VVS and a number of aviational political organs.

The article was discussed at a conference of generals and officers of the political directorate, at a meeting of the party bureau, at an assembly of the communists of the propaganda and agitation section, and at service conferences of those aviational political organs which have lecturers on their staffs. Measures have been outlined to eliminate the shortcomings.

In accordance with the directorates of the VVS political directorate, the work of lecturers in all political organs has been regulated and the time has been determined both for delivering lectures to the troops and for increasing lecturer skills. Additions have been made to the lecture propaganda subjects and the number of lectures dealing with military and moral training problems has been increased.

Complainant Receives His Present

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers(reserve) V. Lototskiy in his letter published under the headline "Take What They Give" on 16 August 1979 complained about the confusion surrounding the presentation of a valuable present to him. Rear Admiral V. Dmitriyev reported to the editorial staff that the officers who committed this mistake have been summarily disciplined. Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers(reserve) V. Lototskiy was given an apology. He was presented, as was his due in accordance with an order of the commander-in-chief of the navy, with a "Viliya" camera.

Naval Shortcomings Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ A member of the military soviet, chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet Vice Admiral V. Sabeneyev reported to the editorial staff after the publication of the correspondence "In a Gap"(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 5 June 1979) that measures have been taken to eliminate the shortcomings noted. The commander of a ship subunit, the officer Yu. Savel'yev, was removed from his post, demoted and, as a communist, was made answerable to the party.

The newspaper article was discussed at a party meeting at headquarters and at a seminar of political workers. The efforts of staff officers have now been concentrated on more concrete work with the commanders of ships and departments. Moreover, special attention is being paid to increasing the quality of combat training, the effectiveness of competition, and the strengthening of military discipline. Instructional exercises and seminars on exchanging know-how to solve combat training problems on a cruise have begun to be conducted regularly. All of this has led to an improvement in things on the lagging ship and in the subunit of ships.

In its first report of 3 August on the measures taken on the correspondence "In a Gap," the editorial staff noted the incompleteness of the reply. In connection with this, Vice Admiral V. Sabaneyev reported that the officials who prepared the initial reply to the correspondence were sternly informed that red tape and form answers were not acceptable. The attention of all chiefs of political organs of the fleet has been directed to the necessity for an effective and business-like response to critical press articles.

Repair Documentation Streamlined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ An article by Colonel of Engineers E. Lukanskiy was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 10 July 1979 under the headline "A Sense of the New and Inertia." It raised questions concerning the improvement of the work style of military engineers and it touched upon what hinders them from truly being engaged in organizational and educational work. The article aroused the interest of our readers and a part of the comments which came to the editors was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 21 July and 9 August.

Responding to the newspaper article were responsible officials of the troop directorate of the PVO/National Air Defense/, Major General of Engineers G. Zamyatin and Colonels of Engineers S. Tulinov and I. Shchenin, who are involved in managing the operation and repair of equipment and weapons and the material and technical supply of the troops. They reported that the article was discussed by the specialists of the directorates. The criticism stated by the author of the article regarding the unwarranted unwieldiness of some of the accounting documents and formal technical condition documents, as well as the duplication of technical information on the condition of some types of weapons, has been correctly acknowledged.

The replies emphasize that work is being systematically conducted among the specialists of the directorates on decreasing the correspondence, and simplifying and re-doing the documentation of the regulating documents and putting them in line with time requirements. They have completed the introduction of a formalized accounting system by technical condition cards through the use of technical data processing means in the anti-aircraft missile units and PVO troop subunits. A decision was made to

sharply reduce the number of accounting documents formerly submitted by the troops. It was also decided not to submit formal technical condition documents when sending anti-aircraft missile equipment into capital repairs. Work is being carried out to reduce the volume of formal documents to be compiled when sending equipment to medium repairs.

Inner-Party Democracy Strengthened

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ A note from Private V. Kraynov headlined "Punished for Principles" was published in this newspaper on 21 August 1979. In it he described the unprincipled position of some communist leaders in attempting to suppress criticism in the subunit where Captain I. Savel'yev serves.

The chief of the unit's political section reported to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial staff that the cases mentioned in the newspaper article took place. The note of the CPSU member Private V. Kraynov was discussed in the political section of the unit and at a conference of the leaders of the construction organizations. Concrete measures were adopted which were aimed at eliminating the exposed shortcomings, and developing inner-party democracy and the initiative of the communists.

Lieutenant Colone of Engineers E. Mushegyan, as the senior chief, was punished for violating the established order at the oxygen station. He was made answerable to the party for suppressing criticism.

Officer's Club Repairs

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ "Seven Years of Red Tape" was the title given to the correspondence of Major I. Yeremo published on 5 August 1979. It described the red tape involved in the repair of a garrison officer's club of the Baltic MD which was being done by the UNR/office of the work supervisor/ whose chief is Colonel of Engineers M. Apartsev.

Lieutenant General A. Ivanov reported to the editorial staff that the criticism of the military builders was acknowledged to be true. The chief of the UNR Colonel of Engineers M. Apartsev was severely disciplined and was made answerable to the party. The work of tying the garrison officer's club into the city heating systems was scheduled to be fulfilled by 15 October 1979.

Training of Young Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ Senior Lieutenant S. Kalinayev's correspondence "Indifference" was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 18 June 1979. It exposed the deficiencies in the deucational work with the young officers of one of the units in the Odessa MD.

Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Savin and Guards Lieutenant Colonel G. Fedorov reported to the editorial staff that the questions of improving the educational work with young officers were discussed at a conference with the leaders, political workers, the party and Komsomol aktivs, and at a general officers' meeting. The assistant chief of the political section for Komsomol work, Senior Lieutenant N. Ustselemov appeared at a meeting of the bureau of the party organization. He was reprimanded for serious shortcomings in the work with the young officers. Concrete measured were taken to draw the young officers into public activities.

The command and the political section are helping the young officers to improve their way of life, and to settle their wives in jobs.

Disabled Veteran Helped

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ Correspondence of 9 June 1979 entitled "Do Not Destine for Oblivion" stated specifically that a disabled World War II veteran F. I. Lobodenko lived under difficult conditions and the local organs of power were not showing proper concern for him.

Comrade S. Okopnyy, secretary of the Belovodskiy Rayon of the Ukrainian Communist Party, reported to the editorial staff that they were now monitoring the assistance to the disabled veteran--the kolkhoz imeni Kalinin was now providing food to him. The war veteran was under the care of doctors. His home was repaired by people from the kolkhoz.

Beautification of a Park

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ In his reply to the letter of A. Grachev published under the headline "A Garden Must Bloom" on 11 July 1979, the deputy chief of the political directorate of the Moscow MD Colonel N. Nesterov reported that the author made a true criticism of the deficiencies in the public services and amenities of Lefortovo Park. Work is now being done on the park's public services and amenities. The All-Union Production Scientific Restoration Combine is carrying out the restoration work. The cleaning of the ponds and the replacement of trees was entrusted to Glavmosinzhstroy /Main Administration for Housing and Civil Engineering Construction in Moscow City/. Unfortunately, the tempo for the work which has been started is inadequate. Measures are being taken to speed it up.

Pollution of Nature Eliminated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ "At Variance with Nature," a letter of Lieutenant Colonel of Justice N. Tur was published in the newspaper on 16 August 1979. Major General of Aviation I. Zhabin reported in a letter that they really do have

violations of the law on preserving nature in a certain garrison. To eliminate the pollution of the surroundings in the garrison, they made cleaning devices, repaired the technological services, and cleaned up the area. A general meeting of personnel was held. The officials guilty of polluting the surroundings were disciplined.

Improvements in Training Young Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The correspondence of Lieutenant Colonel G. Molchan "Relying on Drastic Measures" was published in our newspaper on 4 August 1979. It listed cases of the unsatisfactory work in the education of young officers in the unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Tashchuk. The first deputy chief of the political section of aviation of the Leningrad MD Colonel A. Shakhunov reported to the editorial staff that the newspaper article was discussed at a conference of commanders and their deputies for political affairs. Ways to further improve the forms and methods of political and educational work with the young officers were outlined.

The substantial neglect in the education of his subordinates was sharply pointed out to Lieutenant Colonel V. Tashchuk.

Combat Training Deficiencies Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ "Obligations for a Safe" was the title of the correspondence of Senior Lieutenant A. Oleynik published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 3 August 1979. It exposed deficiencies in the management of socialist competition among the officers of the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sal'nikov who was reduced in position for dereliction of duty.

The deputy commander of the Kiev MD for combat training Lieutenant General I. Yakimovich reported to the editorial staff that the correspondence was discussed at party meetings of the directorates of the combined unit and unit, and at a conference of the battalion officers. The criticism was considered to be correct.

Concrete measures to eliminate the shortcomings noted by the newspaper in the combat training of the battalion were planned and are being carried out by the district directorate of combat training, the staff, and the political section of the combined unit. Instructional methods exercises on organizing competition by tasks and standards were conducted for all of the subunit officers. The obligations of the officers were defined more precisely and were clearly drawn up.

Military Clerical Duties Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The survey of letters to the editor published on 26 July 1979 under the headline "After the Wires" covered cases of the violation of the rules of military clerical duties in some units and institutions, which resulted in discharged or retired servicemen not being able to obtain for a long period of time their "personal affairs" for their chosen place of residence. The chief of staff of the Carpathian MD Lieutenant General M. Tyagunov reported to the editorial staff that the newspaper article was discussed by all officials responsible for registering personnel and sending documents. Measures were taken to abolish cases of an inattentive attitude toward the registration of the personal affairs of servicemen discharged or retired. Summary punishments were imposed on the individuals who violated the rules of military clerical duties.

Shortcomings in Marxist-Leninist Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 79 p 2

/Text/ The correspondence of Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Vertlib published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 8 August 1979 was entitled "A Day of Classes at the Military Commissariat." It criticized the shortcomings in the organization of Marxist-Leninist training of officers in some Rostov Oblast military commissariats.

The chief of the propaganda and agitation section, the deputy chief of the political directorate of the North Caucasus MD Colonel Yu. Sheychenko, reported that the district political directorate heard the chief of the political section of the Rostov Oblast military commissariat Colonel A. Minenko. During his talk he gave concrete recommendations to further improve ideological work in the military commissariats of the oblast. Responsible officials of the oblast military commissariat were appointed section leaders of Marxist-Leninist training groups. Questions on the further improvement of Marxist-Leninist education of officers were discussed in all party organizations of the military commissariats.

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